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ABSTRACT

Yadavalli, Anita P. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2015. U.S. School Quality: The Public
Benefits of Primary and Secondary Education. Major Professors: Raymond J.G.M. Florax
and Larry DeBoer.

Three essays focus on the various measurements of school quality and its importance in
motivating people’s location choices, their interest in school improvement, and their ability
to fund additional school expenditures. The first essay examines hedonic housing price
studies to dissect the mixed evidence on whether school quality affects housing prices.
The chapter employs meta-regression analysis on 48 studies and finds that studies which
measured school quality using any of eight measures, including educational expenditures,
tend to find a positive correlation with housing prices. Additionally, published studies tend
to find a higher correlation than unpublished studies. The second essay aims to remove
the endogeneity bias between educational expenditures and inmigration with generalized
propensity score methods. We restrict the study period to 2006–2010 and our focus to
the population aged 25–49 years. We find that increases in educational expenditures have
a positive effect on inmigration to U.S. counties up to $7,000 but a generally flat effect
beyond that. The third essay examines education tax referenda, which school districts
propose to taxpayers to attain funding additional to their state-allocated funds. The chapter
examines educational finance using sample selection methods to correct for school district
decisions to enter the referenda proposal process and finds that few school districts take
advantage of educational tax referenda, with rural school districts being more likely to
do so than urban school districts. Additionally, the results suggest that racial diversity,

x
competition from private schools and school district size significantly affect proposal and
approval of referenda across rural and urban school districts.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Government intervention in the provision of education arises due to the inability of
individuals to make decisions that improve the positions of all involved parties. There is
evidence that this government intervention may affect the economy positively. Mueller
(2003) cites externalities as the justification for government intervention. Several externalities arise from the provision of education. Levin et al. (2007) enumerate the benefits the
government would reap if more high school students graduate. Specifically, they find the
government would reap $45 billion via extra tax revenues, welfare payments and reduced
costs of public health and crime if the number of high school dropouts was cut in half. A
new high school graduate would produce approximately $209,000 in higher government
revenues and lower government spending for an investment of $82,000. The difference
of these two yields a net economic benefit of $127,000. The government intervenes in
public goods provision and attempts to satisfy the collective needs of all members of the
community by providing public goods, including education.
School funding and the availability of resources have implications for economic development. Several studies have cited the positive relationship between school resources,
which often signal a community’s wealth, and student performance (e.g., Hanushek, 1996).
School improvement plays a large role in regional economic growth, and a population’s
cognitive skills or its educational attainment are often used to understand how a community
can be improved to foster growth. Thus, many educational institutions strive to improve
academic standards and motivate their students to increase the productive capacity of the
economy. This research examines public education from different spatial angles and measures of school quality to improve upon and bridge ties between numerous disputes over
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the fate of public schools. The wide focus on school quality underscores the importance of
development policies to improve public education.
While the provision of education involves governments at the federal, state and local
levels across the world (with the most reliance on federal governments), that is not the case
for the U.S., where the federal government does not intervene. U.S. schools receive most
of their funding from state and local governments. In fact, state and local governments
provide about 93 percent of educational funds in the U.S. (National Center for Education
Statistics, 2013). Since state and local governments take matters into their own hands,
funding policies differ markedly from U.S. state to state, often making the allocation of
funds per pupil inequitable. According to the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES), during academic year 2010–2011, Vermont had the highest state funding per pupil
of $12,827, while South Carolina had the lowest of $1,099, approximately 9 percent of
Vermont’s spending. The average state funding per pupil across all states was $4,568.
The period after the Great Recession poses new issues with respect to school funding.
The Great Recession, which persisted from 2007–2009, has decreased the amount of state
revenues available to many U.S. school districts. Many have experienced an additional
strain on funds, as the property wealth of a community dictates the amount of property
taxes generated for a school district. Approximately 40 percent of U.S. states experienced
decreased funding between academic years 2007–2008 and 2008–2009. However, that figure increased to 66 percent between academic years 2008–2009 and 2009–2010, indicating
that the second year of the Great Recession affected most U.S. states more negatively than
the first year. One year after the Great Recession ended, about 44 percent of U.S. states
continued to experience decreased funding. This suggests the importance of identifying
alternative methods for obtaining additional school funding, one of which is tax referenda.

1.1. Problem Statement
Research on school systems is vast. This is because researchers are interested in quantifying the benefits of education to people. Although we know and understand the concept
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of public education, it is often difficult to measure it in a meaningful way that helps researchers identify the relationship between what people seek and what they are willing to
do for it. Naturally, this information gap raises certain questions that must be answered.
The first question that the relevant literature focuses on is identifying an appropriate way to
measure the significance of schooling. Many previous studies have focused on the measurement of school quality by means of student achievement, educational expenditures and/or
peer effects. After deciding upon that measure, researchers have attempted to uncover the
determinants of various measures of schooling that comprise the broad category of school
quality. These measures of school quality have subsequently been used to identify their
relationship with various public policy and economic development issues.
People seeking the benefits of education may choose to either move to another locality
in hopes of better education for their children or stay in their current locality in hopes of
bettering their local education. If they choose to move to another jurisdiction, they must
consider other factors such as taxation. As discussed above, state and local governments
provide a majority of educational funds in the U.S. Local governments, in particular, fund
public education through property taxes. Therefore, migrants must decide whether the
property taxes they would incur if they move to another locality would provide more value
than if they remain in their current locality and send their children to lesser-quality schools.
If people move towards better education at an overall lower cost, the added demand for
housing should capitalize the value of education into property values, meaning the effect
should be positive. In this research, the first question we encounter relates to the inconclusive results on the effect of various measures of school quality on property values, which
indirectly influence people’s location choices. Some studies have found statistically significant positive and negative results and others have found statistically insignificant results
altogether. Therefore, we employ meta-regression analysis in Chapter 2 to understand the
factors that influence those disparities.
The result of the meta-regression analysis provides a basis upon which to conduct our
own research. Thereby, Chapter 3 relates to whether educational expenditures, in particular, affect where people move. This measure of school quality allows us to empirically

4
test Tiebout’s (1956) hypothesis regarding people’s preferences for public goods. Again,
we encounter the tradeoff between good schools, and the potentially higher property taxes
used to fund those schools. Previous research has examined the relationship between school
spending and people’s destination choice, although they have largely ignored potential endogeneity bias.
While the first two questions examine, either directly or indirectly, the movement of
people, the final question considers their counterpart. If people decide to stay, they may
be presented with options to improve their local schools. One option may be referenda,
by which voters decide the fate of proposed tax increases to fund their schools. As before,
the consideration of taxation remains. Chapter 4 studies educational expenditures for individual U.S. states rather than the nation. While many school districts have the option of
referenda, some have not used them. Of those who have, some have not achieved success.
We examine the factors that influence referenda proposal and success.

1.2. Research Questions
This research addresses three questions: What factors cause discrepancies among analogous studies on the effect of school quality on housing prices? Do public expenditures
for schooling affect where people move? And, what influences the likelihood of referenda
proposals and voter outcomes of those proposals?

1.2.1. Quantitative Techniques to Summarize the Existing House Price Literature
According to Tiebout (1956), voters reveal their preferences for public goods and services by locating in jurisdictions that offer them an optimal mix of expenditures and taxes.
If people value public education, they should consequently move to localities that offer
them the schooling they desire. This demand for property located in jurisdictions with
favored schools should then (statistically significantly) raise property values. This assumption has driven many researchers, beginning with Oates (1969), to use housing price models
to understand how schools influence and affect housing prices.
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School quality has important impacts on people’s decisions to migrate from their current
locality to another and has been measured in different ways across the relevant literature.
Many studies have analyzed the impact of school inputs on parents’ migration decisions by
estimating the effect of educational expenditures on housing prices using the hedonic price
method. Several studies have used test scores, as they reflect both quality of schooling and
students’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (Kane et al., 2005). Others have
preferred measures of peer effects over school inputs and outputs.
The hedonic price technique has been used to parse out the elements of a property
to derive individual price effects of structural and neighborhood characteristics, including
school quality. Previous researchers have surveyed large samples of studies on school
quality and housing prices (e.g., Boyle and Kiel, 2001; Gibbons and Machin, 2008; Black
and Machin, 2009). However, meta-regression analysis is more effective than survey, as it
goes beyond literature review and attempts to identify the underlying factors that separate
one study from another. Meta-regression analysis is useful since many researchers have
examined the effect of various measures of school quality on property values, which do not
have the same magnitude and/or sign across studies. We contribute to the meta-regression
literature by adapting Mundlak’s (1979) methodology to meta-regression analysis.
We reviewed 48 house price studies which observed the impact of primary and secondary school test scores, valued-added measures, expenditures per pupil, pupil/teacher
ratio and measures of peer racial and socioeconomic composition including percent of
African-American, Hispanic and low-income students. Our results suggest that studies
which examined school outputs, school inputs or peer effects find a higher correlation between overall school quality and housing prices, where school outputs have the most statistically and economically significant impact. Additionally, published studies tend to find
a higher correlation than unpublished studies, which provides evidence of the oft-reported
publication bias among scholarly journals. However, this result is contrary to the general
notion that unpublished studies tend to find greater effect sizes.
Interestingly, quasi-experimental methods do not statistically significantly affect the
correlation between school quality and housing prices. These methods allow researchers
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to estimate the causal impact of an action on its target population without random assignment of a treatment or control group. Furthermore, studies that consider more than one
type of school quality measure including peer effects find that school quality does not get
capitalized in housing prices as much as indicated by studies that considered only one type.
The next essay examines educational expenditures as the sole measure of school quality. As the meta-regression analysis reveals that studies which measured school quality
with school spending, a school input, found a positive correlation with housing prices, we
conduct our own research on inmigration to U.S. counties using educational expenditures.

1.2.2. Location Choice of Migrants Looking for Better Schools
This research uses the Tiebout framework to address whether educational expenditures
influence location choices. In the context of Tiebout, educational expenditures should positively and significantly affect people’s decisions to migrate. Concurrently, property taxes
should negatively influence their decisions. Property value models, as discussed above,
and migration models have been used to determine the validity of the Tiebout hypothesis of consumer location in accordance with preferences for local public goods and taxes
(Pack, 1973; Liu, 1977; Cebula and Alexander, 2006; Cebula and Nair-Reichert, 2012).
The movement of people to localities with high educational expenditures implies that
they place value on at least one measure of school quality when making their destination
choices. Schools with high educational expenditures are often localities with relatively high
property values. Residents of those localities can afford higher property taxes to support
their local schools than residents of poorer localities. Wealthy individuals tend to select
themselves into wealthy localities and thereby financially support their local schools. This
makes educational expenditures endogenous in our study of the effect of school quality on
location choice. We attempt to remove the endogeneity bias between educational expenditures and inmigration with generalized propensity score methods.
We restrict our focus to the population aged 25–49 years to examine the effect of primary and secondary educational expenditures on location choices of those likely to have
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school-aged children. We examine inmigration of U.S. counties during the period 2006–
2010 and find that educational expenditures have a positive effect on inmigration to U.S.
counties up to $7,000 per student but a generally flat effect beyond that.

1.2.3. School District Decisions to Propose Referenda and Pass Rates
The period after the Great Recession poses new challenges to public educational finance. To combat the reduction to funds, school districts may propose referenda to obtain
funds additional to their state-allocated funds through property taxes. While many school
districts have taken advantage of this funding mechanism, more have not. As noted above,
many rural school districts have experienced an additional strain on funds compared to urban school districts. Rural regions tend to suffer from declining population, greater poverty
and slower economic recovery than their urban counterparts. This limits the amount of
property tax revenues accrued from their residents and increases the funding gap between
rural and urban school districts. Additionally, per pupil costs of rural schools exceed the
national average, as they often cannot take advantage of economies of scale due to their
small population bases. Less well-funded rural school districts must judge whether to keep
their schools running or to close.
Based on our study sample, rural school districts tend to propose and pass more referenda than their urban counterparts. This research addresses two questions: Why do rural
school districts propose more referenda? What influences the likelihood of referenda success? Two types of explanatory variables likely provide the answers to these questions.
First, school districts propose different types of referenda based on their expectations or
needs. For example, they propose general referenda only if they think they can pass (as
these referenda often seek voter approval of property tax increases for general educational
purposes) but propose construction referenda when their facilities require attention. The
type of referenda often differs by state and can be modeled as an unobserved state fixed
effect in the absence of referenda type-specific data. Second, the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of school districts, which differ widely across rural and urban
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school districts, influence their decisions to propose referenda and voters’ decisions to pass
them. We use a current data set spanning 2010–2013 from school districts in Indiana,
Illinois and Michigan to address these points.
The results suggest that few school districts take advantage of educational tax referenda,
with rural school districts being more likely to do so than urban school districts. Those that
perceive a higher chance of success are more likely to propose referenda. Additionally, the
results suggest that racial diversity, competition from private schools and school district
size significantly affect proposal and approval of referenda across rural and urban school
districts. For example, while urban and rural school districts with all-white populations are
more likely to propose referenda than those with nonwhite populations, urban nonwhite
residents have no effect on referenda pass rates, suggesting that school boards may benefit
from proposing more referenda in urban nonwhite school districts. Additionally, while rural
school districts with private school alternatives are less likely to propose referenda, urban
school districts are more likely. This could mean that either urban school districts have
more confidence in voter support or that rural school districts do not properly understand
their residents’ preferences. Moreover, school districts with relatively large enrollments are
less likely to propose referenda. The approval response is more specific, as voters of small
rural school districts are more likely to approve referenda than voters of larger rural school
districts.

1.3. Dissertation Structure
This dissertation will be structured in line with the three research questions above.
The second chapter will introduce the existing literature on school quality and its effect
on house prices, followed by the problem statement, research questions and study method
of meta-regression analysis. The third chapter will narrow the focus of school quality to
educational expenditures and present the econometric problem of endogeneity between
educational expenditures and county-level inmigration. This will be followed by the study
method of generalized propensity score. The fourth chapter will further narrow the focus of
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educational expenditures to the school district level and analyze the factors that influence
whether school districts propose educational tax referenda and whether voters support or
reject them. The purpose of the final chapter is to provide an overall conclusion, discussion
and policy recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL QUALITY ON HOUSING PRICES: A
META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS

2.1. Introduction
People choose to migrate from one location to another based on many factors, one of
which may be school quality. The framework most often associated with such behavior
is the Tiebout (1956) model, which states that voters reveal their preferences for public
goods by locating in jurisdictions that offer them an optimal mix of expenditures and taxes.
Tiebout assumes local governments provide services to people under their jurisdictions
and charge a price for those services in the form of taxes. If that is true, property values
should change based on services such as schooling,1 an assumption that has driven many
researchers to use housing price models to understand the role that schools play in migration patterns and property values (e.g., Oates, 1969; Hamilton, 1976; Rosen and Fullerton,
1977; Gurwitz, 1980; Jud and Watts, 1981; Dubin and Goodman, 1982; Hayes and Taylor, 1996; Black, 1999; Downes and Zabel, 2002; Brasington and Haurin, 2006; Clapp et
al., 2008; Chiodo et al., 2010). That is, researchers want to know whether school quality
affects housing prices.
Housing prices depend on structural and neighborhood characteristics, of which school
quality has been widely studied and remains to be of utmost importance. School quality
has been measured in different ways across the relevant literature. Many studies have analyzed the impact of school inputs on parents’ migration decisions by estimating the effect
of educational expenditures on housing prices. Several studies have used school outputs
such as test scores, as they reflect both school quality and student characteristics (Kane et
1 Tiebout

implies the effect of educational services on housing prices ought to be positive and statistically
significant.
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al., 2005) and value added, which analyzes incremental changes to a student’s academic
achievement. Others have preferred measures of peer effects, which include measures of
socioeconomic and racial composition and often have implications for a student’s success
based on his/her environment. While school inputs and outputs tend to positively influence
housing prices, peer effects have the opposite effect.
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the factors that have caused previous studies to reach inconclusive results across the hedonic housing price literature. Two primary
differences among the estimation results reported across the previous literature include the
measurement of school quality and the magnitude of impact on housing prices. These differences motivate two research questions: 1) which aspects of school quality get capitalized
in housing prices?, and 2) what are the key differences among studies that prefer quasiexperimental methods to traditional regression techniques? To answer those questions, our
work examines U.S. and other North American and European studies that have examined
the effect of school quality based on the hedonic housing price framework. We use metaregression analysis to identify the factors that have caused disparities among studies that
examined the effects of different measures of educational services on housing prices.
We reviewed 48 housing price studies that observed the impact of primary and secondary school test scores, value added, expenditures per pupil, pupil/teacher ratio and peer
racial and socioeconomic composition. Our analysis of all school quality measures shows
that studies which examined school outputs, school inputs or peer effects find a higher correlation between overall school quality and housing prices, where primary and secondary
school test scores have the most statistically and economically significant impact. The results show that published studies tend to find a higher correlation than unpublished studies.
Additionally, previous researchers’ use of quasi-experimental methods was found to have
no effect the association. The estimation results provide an understanding of the importance
of including certain key determinants in housing price analyses.
The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes relevant studies and the
models they have used to examine the impact of school quality on housing prices. Sec-
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tion 2.3 describes the meta-regression analysis method, and Section 2.4 describes the data
sample. The final two sections provide empirical results and the conclusion.

2.2. Background
2.2.1. Study Effects
The seminal study by Oates (1969) examines the effect of school quality on housing
prices. Oates assumes the consumer maximizes his utility and chooses to reside in the
locality which provides him with ”the greatest surplus of benefits over costs”, supportive of
the Tiebout (1956) model. Oates states that a community’s decision to increase its property
tax rate to expand its output of public services may lead to higher net rental income to
property owners. This provides a way to determine the validity of the Tiebout model.
Oates employs school expenditures as a proxy for the output level of educational services, which has been deemed inappropriate due to its ineffectiveness in measuring student
outcomes (Pollakowski, 1973; Gustely, 1976; Rosen and Fullerton, 1977). Rosen and
Fullerton (1977) state that although property values are probably influenced by the quality of schooling, it is not clear that the latter is measured adequately by expenditures on
education. The authors find the effect of expenditures on housing prices to be statistically
insignificant and negative, which is contrary to theory. Brueckner (1979) states that even
those study results that show significant relationships between public school spending and
property values establish only that consumers value the public goods they consume but
that this does not say anything about the efficiency of public goods provision. Indeed, the
relevant research has since focused mostly on the value to consumers of school quality
measures and rarely on the efficiency of those measures. For example, Hayes and Taylor
(1996) find no evidence that homebuyers are willing to pay for higher school spending on
students, an illustration of value to homebuyers but not necessarily the efficiency of the
distribution of educational expenditures.
The preference for school outputs (e.g., test scores and high school graduation rates)
over school inputs (e.g., expenditures and pupil/teacher ratio) has developed as a result of
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school inputs’ lack of impact on student outcomes (Hanushek, 1986, 1997). Furthermore,
test scores have been found to be more effective in explaining property values, which, if
modeled correctly, should provide an indicator of people’s decisions to migrate based on
school quality (e.g., Rosen and Fullerton, 1977; Dubin and Goodman, 1982; Johnson and
Lea, 1982; Jud, 1985; Black, 1999; Downes and Zabel, 2002; Loubert, 2005; Brasington
and Haurin, 2006; Sedgley et al., 2008). For example, Black (1999) finds that parents
are willing to pay 2.5 percent more for a 5 percent increase in test scores. Using the
regression discontinuity designed employed by Black (1999), Kane et al. (2003) find an
even larger willingness to pay, indicating that model assumptions regarding the inclusion
of neighborhood characteristics (e.g., race and educational attainment of the population)
influence the results. Furthermore, estimation results are not necessarily generalizable to
other studies, as the sample localities may have very different characteristics. For example,
Dills (2004) finds that Texas homebuyers do not value test pass rate gains, suggesting that
housing prices do not reflect actual increases in school quality.
Another measure is value added, which refers to the marginal effect of school quality
outcomes over a period of time. A “good” school has been described as one with high
value added, meaning that it takes its students as given and noticeably adds to their level of
knowledge (Boardman and Murnane, 1979; Aitkin and Longford, 1986; Hayes and Taylor,
1996; Hanushek and Taylor, 1990; Brasington, 1999; Downes and Zabel, 2002; Dills, 2004;
Brasington and Haurin, 2006). The absence of such a measure could mean that school outcomes would reflect students’ innate aptitudes or their parents’ characteristics, leading to
endogeneity bias if not accounted for properly. Results on the economical and statistical significance of value-added measures are inconclusive, as some researchers found that
compared to the level of test scores, value-added measures are not capitalized in housing
prices (e.g., Brasington, 1999; Downes and Zabel, 2002; Brasington and Haurin, 2006).
For example, Brasington (1999) finds that compared to exam pass rates, value-added measures do not significantly affect the housing market. Contrarily, Hayes and Taylor (1996)
conclude that homebuyers are willing to pay more for marginal improvements to student
performance.
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Peer effects, which describe the impact(s) peers have on one another and can be measured by the socioeconomic level of students (Ladd, 2002), comprise another measure of
school quality. This is based on the observation that student achievementl is highly correlated with the socioeconomic and racial composition of the student body. Factors including
student race composition (i.e., percent students that are black, Hispanic or Asian) and percent of students enrolled in reduced-price lunch programs have been used as indicators of
peer effects. Among the housing price literature, results based on the socioeconomic composition of peers (Jud, 1985; Weimer and Wolkoff, 2001; Dills, 2004) are mixed. Hayes
and Taylor (1996) find no evidence that student body characteristics are capitalized in housing prices. However, Loubert (2005) finds that improvement in academic achievement as
measured by test scores increases the average cost of a home, but that it is statistically
significant only when schools have higher concentrations of white students.
The varied effects of school quality on housing prices imply that two main factors
influence the results. One is the type of school quality measure used, as some traditionally
produce positive effects (i.e., school inputs and outputs) and others produce negative effects
(i.e., some peer effects). The second is whether more than one measure of school quality is
used to explain property values. The fact that several studies found opposite effects from
the theoretically derived effects implies that excluding key school quality measures may
cause further dissimilarities across studies.

2.2.2. Study Methods
Three types of study methods have been typically used across the relevant literature:
traditional hedonic pricing, spatial process models and quasi-experimental designs. The
hedonic housing price model described below is often used to explain the functioning of
housing markets. Previous researchers have largely estimated such models under the assumption that neighborhood characteristics could effectively predict housing prices through
the inclusion of separate dummy variables for traits such as the educational attainment and
race of neighbors, air quality and criminal activity. Some researchers have recognized the
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potential endogeneity between neighborhood characteristics and housing prices, as some
characteristics are unobservable and cannot be measured. Quasi-experimental methods
have been used to combat the problem of endogeneity. Both hedonic pricing and quasiexperimental methods do not consider the spillover effects of housing prices on one another, which has led several researchers to additionally consider spatial process models.
The variation in study methods complicates our analysis, which we motivate below.
The hedonic housing price function (Rosen, 1974) describes the housing transaction
sales price or assessed value (Rosen and Fullerton, 1977; Johnson and Lea, 1982; Jud,
1985; Brasington and Hite, 2005) as a function of the characteristics of a house and its
surrounding neighborhood. The hedonic method offers a way to estimate the prices of
separate characteristics that comprise housing, a composite good. Characteristics typical
to most housing prices are structural characteristics (e.g., number of bedrooms and bathrooms, lot size, living area size), neighborhood characteristics (e.g., crime rate, air quality,
socioeconomic demographics of the residents) and school characteristics (e.g., expenditures per pupil, test scores, racial composition of peers). The price associated with each
structural or neighborhood characteristic represents that of the marginal purchaser and is
defined as the implicit or hedonic price.
The regressor of primary interest in our analysis is school quality, which is measured
in different ways as indicated above. The typical model (Downes and Zabel, 2002) is as
follows:

Vit = α + Xit β1 + Nit β2 + Sit β3 + εit ,

(2.1)

where i = 1, . . . , N; t = 1, . . . , T; Vit represents housing value and depends on structural
characteristics Xit , neighborhood characteristics Nit and school characteristics Sit ; and ε it
is an unobservable stochastic random variable. For the purposes of the meta-regression
analysis, we are interested in the marginal effect of Sit , or β3 . Note the coefficients for Xit ,
Sit and Nit are assumed to be constant over time.2
2 The

linear form of equation (2.1) has been disapproved of by some researchers. For example, Chiodo et al.
(2010) found the linear specification for test scores underestimates the housing price premium at high levels
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One drawback of estimating equation (2.1) as is, is that not all relevant house or neighborhood characteristics can be observed. While equation (2.1) assumes that observed characteristics can adequately measure housing prices, there likely exist omitted variables that
are unobserved. Black (1999) notes the possiblity of estimation bias from two types of
omitted variables. The first refers to variables that vary at the school district level, such as
property tax rates and public goods provision. The second refers to variables that change
over space, such as neighborhood characteristics. To combat those potential biases, Black
employs a quasi-experimental design that allows her to examine houses that share the same
attendance district boundary. By doing so, she controls for house characteristics and attributes any differences across the boundary to test scores. Black attempts to control for
space by looking at houses on the opposite sides of attendance district boundaries. However, strictly speaking, spatial methods should be used to account for spatial spillovers
across larger spatial scales.
Can (1990) notes that the assumption of fixed structural parameters (i.e., the marginal
price for a structural attribute in one area is the same as or similar to another area) as specified by other models does not incorporate the spatial dynamics operating in local urban
housing markets. This, she states, fails to take into account the diversity among neighborhood structures within metropolitan areas. Brasington (1999) likewise finds that ordinary
least squares estimation of the housing price model produces biased and inconsistent estimates, as each housing price influences nearby housing prices, leading to spatial autocorrelation. To address the problem of spatial autocorrelation, Brasington (1999) employs the
spatial Durbin model as follows:

Vit = ρWVit + Zit β +W Z̃it α + εit ,

(2.2)

where the errors are normally distributed, Vit represents housing value, ρ is the spatial
autoregressive parameter to be estimated, W is an n by n spatial weight matrix, Zit is the
vector of explanatory variables that includes Xit , Nit and Sit from equation (2.1), Z̃it is the
of school quality and overestimates the premium at low levels of school quality, thereby creating non-linear
effects.
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explanatory variable matrix Zit with the intercept excluded and α is the parameter associated with the spatial lag of the explanatory variables. The WV term captures the extent to
which housing prices in one area are affected by the price of houses in neighboring areas.
Note the parameter estimate of school quality is not simply β3 as we note in equation
(2.1), but it additionally includes the estimated spatial autoregressive parameter ρ and the
spatial weight matrix W as:
∂Vit
= (I − ρW )−1 (β3 +W γ3 )
∂ Sit

(2.3)

Due to the spatial weight matrix, the marginal effect of school quality is more complicated. LeSage and Pace (2009) argue the simplest case arises for a row or doubly stochastic
W, in which case the average total effect simply converges to:
∂Vit
= (1 − ρ)−1 β3
∂ Sit

(2.4)

2.3. Methodology
Meta-regression analysis provides a way to summarize results from disparate studies of
the same topic and has been expressed as the ”regression analysis of regression analyses”
(Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). This analysis has been used mostly for medical research, although it has also made its way into the public finance and economic literature (Ballal and
Rubenstein, 2009; Nelson and Kennedy, 2009). The hedonic housing price model, in particular, has been studied via meta-regression analysis (Smith and Huang, 1995; Nelson, 2004;
Sirmans et al., 2005, 2006) and in qualitative surveys (Boyle and Kiel, 2001; Gibbons and
Machin, 2008; Black and Machin, 2009). Meta-regression analysis is more effective than
survey methods, as it goes beyond literature review and attempts to quantitatively identify
the underlying factors that separate one study from another.
Meta-regression analysis is useful since many prior researchers have examined the
effect of school quality on property values, which does not have the same magnitude
and/or sign across studies. Furthermore, the estimation method varies among ordinary
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least squares, two-stage least squares and maximum likelihood estimation, for example.
Stanley and Jarrell (1989) suggested the following meta-regression model to help explain
diverse findings.
K

b j = β + ∑ αk Z jk + e j

j = 1, 2, . . . , L,

(2.5)

k=1

where b j is the reported estimate of β (i.e. the effect size of school quality on property
values) of the jth study of L studies, β is the true value of the parameter of interest, Z jk
is the vector of meta-independent (or moderator) variables which measures relevant study
characteristics and explains their systematic variation from other results in the literature,
and e j is the meta-regression disturbance term.
While regression estimates seem like the logical choice for the effect size, b j , studies
that have examined the effect of school quality on housing prices differ with respect to
data, sample size, definition of school quality and use of different explanatory variables.
This creates the potential for heteroskedasticity of the error terms, which may be combated
through the use of t-statistics as suggested by Stanley and Jarrell (1989). However, Becker
and Wu (2007) point out important drawbacks of that method, as the t-statistic – which
contains information on sample size, precision and magnitude – can be large when the slope
is large or the standard error is small. Therefore, one cannot draw definite conclusions on
the effectiveness and efficiency of the parameter estimate based on the t-statistic alone.
The effect size could be expressed as an ordered variable taking on different values
based on the p-value calculated from its t-statistic (Koetse et al., 2006). The outcomes of
the primary studies used for this analysis differ largely with respect to the magnitude and
direction of the effect size. The use of an ordered probit model would circumvent the issue
of comparing “apples and oranges”, which refers to the incomparability of estimates across
studies using school inputs, outputs, and/or peer effects.
The effect size may alternatively be expressed as a partial correlation coefficient (Hedges, 1988; Crouch, 1996; Root et al., 2003; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004) and has been
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recommended for use by researchers in public policy and the social sciences (Ringquist,
2013). The partial correlation coefficient and its variance are given as follows:
p
r = t/ t 2 + d f , V [r] = (1 − r2 )2 /(n − 1),

(2.6)

where t is the t-statistic and df is the degrees of freedom (n – k – 1) associated with the
regression parameter estimate from study i. Any bias resulting from this measure is likely
to be trivial with respect to the number of independent variables k. While increasing k will
decrease the degrees of freedom df, the change in df will be more influenced by the sample
size n, which causes the bias to disappear in large n (Ringquist, 2013). The correlation
coefficient as given above, however, does have shortcomings such that it is bounded by -1
and 1 and that its variance depends on the value calculated in equation (2.4). Therefore,
the Fisher’s z transformation of the correlation coefficient is often used in meta-analysis.
Nevertheless, we prefer the correlation coefficient over its transformation, as we do not
believe this presents any major problems.

2.3.1. Estimators
Effect-size estimates often have non-homogeneous variances due to different primary
sample sizes, sample observations and estimation procedures. We account for more than
one measure of school quality, which causes variation across effect sizes (b j ) and should
be accounted for when summarizing results from many studies. Two types of models are
common to meta-regression analysis: fixed effects and random (mixed) effects models.3
Practically, fixed effects assume that moderator variables, which comprise study characteristics and enter meta-regression models as binary independent variables, tackle effect
size heterogeneity completely. However, the impossibility of accounting for every study
variation (and parisimoniously) through binary fixed effects creates problems. Additionally, population parameters estimated across public management and policy literature are
3 Note

the meanings of fixed- and random-effects models here differ from those associated with panel data
models.
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conditional upon control variables, which studies use different variations of and thereby
estimate different coefficients. The effect sizes that are calculated from those coefficients
generate considerable effect size heterogeneity (Ringquist, 2013). Finally, the results from
random-effects models are generalizable to all other studies sharing the characteristics of
the studies included in the dataset, whereas those from fixed-effects are not (Cooper and
Hedges, 1994a). According to Ringquist (2013), the fixed-effects meta-regression model
”is useful pedagogically,” but the random-effects model is preferable due to the incidences
of biased parameter estimates, unreliable parameter variances and inflated type-I errors
when between- and within-study variation are present.
We explore the panel data structure, which has been recommended for dealing with
systematic effects on multiple estimates obtained from the same study (Sturtevant et al.,
1995; van den Bergh, 2002). Traditionally, panel data refers to multi-dimensional data
often involving measurements over time. However, it can allow for distinguishing groups
either by study (i.e., multiple estimates from the same study) or by problem (e.g., measure
of school quality, where the panel structure would be defined by multiple estimates of the
same measurement from different studies).
As with cross-sectional data, panel data may be estimated using fixed- or random
effects. However, random-effects for panel data has come under scrutiny (Stanley and
Doucouliagos, 2012; Leonard et al., 2013). Due to the stricter assumption made by randomeffects panel models of independence between moderator variables and the unobserved
effect, fixed-effects panel methods are preferred as the general approach for allowing correlation between study-level effects and moderator variables. However, we face the issue
of perfect collinearity, because many study-level indicators do not vary within the study.
For example, the indicator for publication will be the same across all estimates from the
same study. Likewise, the country of the study or the measure of housing price data will
likely remain the same. Contrarily, the estimator and explanatory variables generally vary
across estimates, as researchers often present estimation results from various estimation
techniques and model specifications for sensitivity and robustness checks.
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To tackle this issue, we follow Mundlak (1979), who considers the panel data regression
model:
yi j = Xi0j β + µi + vi j , i = 1, · · · , N; j = 1, · · · , J,

(2.7)

where j refers to study and i refers to the individual effects, which are a linear function of
the averages of all the explanatory variables such as:
µi = X̄i0 π + εi ,

(2.8)

where εi ∼ IIN(0, σε2 ), vi j ∼ IIN(0, σv2 ), and X̄i0 is a 1 × K vector of observations on the
explanatory variables averaged over time. Substitution of equation (2.8) into (2.7) gives:
yi j = Xi0j β + X̄i0 π + ε + vi j , i = 1, · · · , N; j = 1, · · · , J,

(2.9)

where β̂ yields the within estimator and π̂ yields the difference between the within and
between estimators. Using the chain rule, the marginal effects of X i follow as:

∂y
∂ xi

= β̂ + ∂∂ x̄y ∂∂xx̄i

(2.10)

= β̂ + J π̂n ,
where n refers to the total number of observations.
Note that β̂ provides the same estimates as the fixed-effects panel model. However,
Mundlak’s approach allows us to estimate the parameters without issues of perfect collinearity by including individual study effects X̄i0 . We then estimate the nested model of individual and overall effects with weighted least squares, where we face the downside that it is
less efficient than maximum likelihood.
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2.4. Data
This study examines 48 U.S. and other Norther American and European housing price
studies (Gibbons and Machin, 2003; Kim et al., 2003; Rosenthal, 2003; Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004; Gravel et al., 2006; Gibbons and Machin, 2008; Ries and Somerville, 2010).
Table 2.1 provides the meta-regression independent variables, descriptions and summary
statistics and Table 2.2 provides the summary of studies (where Pts = primary school test
scores; Sts = secondary school test scores; VA = value-added; Exp = educational expenditures; Ptr = pupil/teacher ratio; Af = African-American students; His = Hispanic-American
students; and Lin = low-income students).

Table 2.1.: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Moderator Variables
Variable
effsize

Description
Mean
Std. Dev.
correlation coefficient calculated using re0.041
0.104
gression estimate from study j
schout
1 if primary or secondary school test score or
0.652
0.477
value-added
schinp
1 if educational expenditures
0.196
0.397
schpeer
1 if African-American, Hispanic or low0.152
0.359
income students
schoutcond 1 if effect size is conditional on schout
0.856
0.352
schinpcond 1 if effect size is conditional on schinp
0.410
0.492
schpeercond 1 if effect size is conditional on schpeer
0.333
0.472
journ
1 if published in scholarly journal
0.777
0.417
yrdata
average year of data from study
1991
11.554
rent
1 if monthly rent
0.150
0.357
neighchar
1 if measure of noise, air quality, resident age
0.613
0.487
and/or educational attainment, crime or tax
rate
logy
1 if natural log of housing prices as depen0.719
0.450
dent variable
x2sls
1 if two-stage least squares
0.235
0.424
ols
1 if ordinary least squares
0.635
0.482
qexper
1 if quasi-experimental methods
0.233
0.423

Y
Y
Y
Y

1
7
6
5

Meadows
(1976)
Schnare
and
Struyk (1976)
McMillan and
Carlson (1977)
Rosen
and
Fullerton
(1977)
Harrison
and
Rubinfeld
(1978)

Y

5

Heinberg and
Oates (1970)
Kain
and
Quigley (1970)
Pollakowski
(1973)
Edel and Sclar
(1974)
Gustely (1976)
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y

9
9
4
8

3

Y
Y

1
2

Orr (1968)
Oates (1969)

Pub.

Obs.

Study

1970

1970

1970

1971

1960 and 1970

1970

1930-1970

1960

1967

1960

1960
1960

Time

Ptr

Dills (2004)

Cheshire
and
Sheppard (2004)

13

8

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

1994-1999

1999

1996

1993-2001

1998-2001

1987 and 1991

1982

1997

1995

1983-1988

1993-1995
1991

Obs. Pub. Time

Black (1999)
7
Brasington
12
(1999)
Bogart
and 5
Cromwell (2000)
Clauretie
and 16
Neill (2000)
Weimer
and 35
Wolkoff (2001)
Brunner et al. 4
(2002)
Downes
and 26
Zabel (2002)
Gibbons
and 15
Machin (2003)
Kane
et
al. 63
(2003)
Rosenthal (2003) 10

Study

Table 2.2 – continued

Pts, Exp

Exp

Exp

Exp

Exp

Exp

Exp

Pts

Exp

Exp
Exp

Sch. Qty.

Table 2.2.: Summary of Studies

Pts, Sts, Af,
His, Lin

Pts, Sts

Sts

Pts, Af, VA

Pts, Exp, Af,
His, Lin, VA
Pts

Pts, Sts, Lin,
Ptr
Pts, Exp

Pts, Lin

Pts, Af

Pts, Exp, Ptr
Pts

Sch. Qty.

23

Y

Y
Y

12

2
1
1

Cushing (1984)

Longstreth et al. 4
(1984)
Jud (1985)
6
Hayes and Tay- 10
lor (1996)
Goodman and 1
Thibodeau
(1998)

Y

4

1975
1980
1987
1995-1997

Y
N
Y

1970

1979

1978

1978

1977

1971-1972

1970

1960

Time

Y

Y

Y

3

Y

1

Li and Brown
(1980)
Jud and Watts
(1981)
Dubin
and
Goodman
(1982)
Johnson
and
Lea (1982)
Krantz (1982)

Y

2

Brueckner
(1979)
Gurwitz (1980)

Pub.

Obs.

Study

Bayer
et
al.
(2007)
Clapp
et
al.
(2008)
Sedgley et al.
(2008)
Caetano (2009)

Brasington and
Haurin (2006)
Gravel et al.
(2006)

Brasington and
Hite (2005)
Kane
et
al.
(2005)
Loubert (2005)

9

12

24

62

1

18

12

24

6

Pts, Af
Winters (2009)
1
Pts, Exp, VA Chiodo et al. 9
(2010)
Pts
Ries
and 18
Somerville
(2010)

Ptr

Exp

Exp

Pts

Pts, VA, Ptr

Pts, Af

Pts

Exp

Exp

Y

N
N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

1999

2002-2007
1998-2001

2000

2002

1994-2004

1994

1989

2000

1990 and 1997

1994-1999

1991

Table 2.2 – Continued from last page
School Qty. Study
Obs. Pub. Time

Pts, Sts

Pts
Pts

Pts

Pts, Af, His,
Lin
Pts, Sts

Pts

Pts, Sts, Exp,
VA
Ptr

Pts, Exp, Af

Pts, Af, VA

Pts

School Qty.

24
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We conducted an extensive search of housing price studies in the context of school
quality. We examined journal articles, dissertations, reports and working papers largely
through the EBSCOhost Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost Academic Search Premier,
Elsevier ScienceDirect Complete, LexisNexis Academic, JSTOR and ProQuest Research
databases using the keywords school quality, housing prices, property values, and Tiebout
sorting. Based on those papers, we identified further, relevant studies using the “snowball” method. Furthermore, we consulted Gibbons and Machin (2010), who reviewed the
literature on school quality and performance through housing valuations, and we included
pertinent studies that we had not previously identified. Although the housing price literature
measures various effects in addition to school quality (e.g., school choice and prevalence of
private schools, air quality, incidence of crime and the conglomeration of groups by race),
we restrict our sample to studies whose aim was to estimate the effect of school quality
on housing prices through separate school input, output or peer variables. For example,
Brasington and Haurin (2009) conversely create composite school, parents’ and peer group
components, which makes it hard to infer the meaning of the estimates. Therefore, we do
not include those estimates in our meta-regression analysis.

2.4.1. School Quality
Various measures of school quality have been used across the literature. We observe the
impacts of primary and secondary school test scores; value added; expenditures per pupil;
pupil/teacher ratio; and peer racial and socioeconomic composition identified by percent
of African-American students, percent of Hispanic-American students and percent of lowincome students. Studies that have examined the impact of primary school test scores
comprise the largest part of the sample (52 percent), with the next largest being educational
expenditures (16 percent). The remaining school quality measures range from 3–9 percent,
on average, across the sample of studies.
We include dummy variables for each type of school quality: school outputs (i.e., primary, secondary school test scores, value added), school inputs (i.e., educational expen-
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ditures, pupil/teacher ratio) and peer effects (i.e., percent of African-American students,
percent of Hispanic-American students, percent of low-income students). Additionally, we
include control variables for studies that employed more than one measure of school quality. For example, if study i’s regression estimate for primary test score is conditional on
educational expenditures, we control for it through an additional dummy variable. A majority of studies controlled for primary school test scores. This suggests that although previous studies examined other measures of school quality, they generally controlled for the
oft-studied and -reported test scores such as reading, math and science at the elementaryand middle-school levels. Noteworthy, however, are the low number of studies that controlled for school inputs and peer effects. Four of the five measures of school quality were
controlled for by fewer than seven percent of the studies.
The study sample consists of positive statistically significant/ insignificant and negative
statistically significant/insignificant estimates. Of the 520 observations, 283 (54.42 percent) comprise positive significant estimates at the 10 percent level or below; 107 (20.58
percent) comprise positive insignificant; 53 (10.19 percent) comprise negative significant;
and 75 (14.42 percent) comprise negative insignificant estimates. The average study effect size ranges from –0.35 to 0.50, with the majority of estimates between –0.15 and 0.2.
Figure 2.1 shows a histogram of the effect sizes across studies.

2.4.2. Moderator Variables
Moderator variables are often introduced to meta-regression models as dummy variables for various study characteristics. Our aim is to reduce any omitted variable bias
resulting from excluding key variables across our sample of studies. We identified over 50
meta-independent variables across the sample and categorized them into three main classes
of variables (additional to the school quality measures). The first class is study characteristics, which identify the publication status and average data year of the article and type of
housing price data used. The second class comprises structural characteristics including the
number of rooms and presence of indoor and outdoor amenities and neighborhood charac-
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Figure 2.1. Histogram of Effect Sizes Across Studies

teristics including resident educational attainment and crime rate. The final class identifies
the study methodology, functional form and estimator.
Study characteristics identify the sample size and data source/methods. It is well known
that published articles generally showcase statistically significant estimates and that “file
drawer” articles remain unpublished by their authors due to statistically insignificant or
inconclusive results. This leads to publication bias, which may drive any differences in
the magnitude and significance of estimates across both the published and unpublished
literature. We account for publication bias with the variable journ by identifying those
articles that have been published in scholarly journals.
The type of housing price data can be categorized into three groups. The variable sales
for transaction sales price (coded 1 if market sales price or 0 if assessed housing value)
and the variable rent for monthly rent are important to include since those measures are
unequal. The assessed value is used by the county’s property tax office to determine the
property tax paid for each tax year, and the sales price refers to the amount for which a
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home sells in the real estate market. Property rent is measured on a monthly basis while
assessed value and sales price are not.
We construct the variable neighchar based on the presence of socioeconomic and demographic variables such as noise, resident age, resident educational attainment, crime,
effective tax rate and/or industry characteristics. Several studies have examined the impact
of introducing neighborhood quality variables, such as air quality (Harrison and Rubinfeld,
1976; Li and Brown, 1980), crime rate (Kain and Quigley, 1970; Dubin and Goodman,
1982; Brasington, 1999; Brasington and Haurin, 2006) and measures of racial heterogeneity (Hayes and Taylor, 1996; Downes and Zabel, 2002; Loubert, 2005), to the housing price
model.
The estimation technique varies considerably across studies. Several studies accounted
for neighborhood characteristics through quasi-experimental methods, by extracting the
causal effects of interventions by assigning thresholds above and/or below which an intervention is assigned. For example, Black (1999) states that attempts to estimate the causal
effect of school quality on housing prices have been complicated by the tendency of better
neighborhoods to house better schools. To combat this problem, Black and later, others
(Kane et al., 2005; Bayer et al., 2007; Chiodo et al., 2010; Ries and Somerville, 2010)
compare houses on opposite sides of attendance district boundaries and thereby attempted
to control for variation in property tax rates and school spending through boundary fixed
effects. Those studies may or may not have incorporated additional neighborhood variables under the notion that methods such as regression discontinuity design control for
such characteristics. While Black (1999) does not, Chiodo et al. (2010) find the inclusion
of observable neighborhood characteristics such as age, sex and race of the population in
addition to boundary fixed effects is necessary for understanding the true effect of school
quality on housing prices. They find that inclusion of neighborhood characteristics plus
boundary fixed effects notably decreases the magnitude of the school quality measure.
To account for quasi-experimental methods we include the variable qexper. We also account for primary estimation methods (i.e., ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares,
maximum likelihood estimation), as their exclusion could be cause for estimation bias.
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Several studies have found the application of two-stage least squares estimation unnecessary after employing previous researchers’ methods to ensure the absence of endogeneity
bias (e.g., Black 1999 uses the regression discontinuity design to account for neighborhood
characteristics). The descriptive statistics (Table 2.1) show that ordinary least squares was
used more frequently across the study sample, on average, than two-stage least squares.

2.5. Results and Discussion
First we examine the complete sample of school quality measures. Table 2.3 presents
the estimation results for fixed-effects, random-effects and Mundlak-specified panel models. We use 14 moderator variables measuring school quality, methodology, functional
form, estimator and measurement of housing value to account for variation across the effect
sizes (note that we condense our analysis to these variables to preserve degrees of freedom).
We examine eight school quality variables: primary school test scores, secondary school
test scores, value added, expenditures per pupil, pupil/teacher ratio and peer racial and socioeconomic composition. Then we examine models with only school outputs and with
only school inputs. Table 2.4 presents the estimation results for the Mundlak specification.

2.5.1. Complete Sample of School Quality Measures
First, we investigate publication bias by examining funnel plots (i.e., scatterplots of effect sizes from individual studies against a measure of study size, often the standard error).
We use the residual values from the estimated fixed- and random-effects models, respectively, to contruct the funnel plots. The dotted lines shown in Figure 2.2 identify the 95
percent confidence limits around the summary treatment effect (i.e., residual values from
estimation). The limits show the expected distribution of studies in the absence of heterogeneity or of selection biases and imply that 95 percent of the studies should lie within the
funnel in the absence of heterogeneity. Both funnel plots are fairly symmetrical. We notice
that many of the residual values from the random-effects model estimation are concentrated around 0.06, whereas those from the fixed-effects model estimation are concentrated
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around 0. This suggests that the difference between the observed and the estimated values
is higher for the random-effects than for the fixed-effects model, which makes sense since
random-effects controls for unobserved heterogeneity by drawing the effect size at random.
We estimate fixed- and random-effects panel models using R’s plm command. Specifically, we have an unbalanced panel with multiple estimates from each study, which likely
contributes to effect size heterogeneity due to differences among the datasets used across
studies. We cluster standard errors by study to account for the information common to all
units within the same group. Although we cluster the standard errors by study identification
to allow correlation among observations from the same study, many would argue that is not
sufficient. As sampling variability across the primary studies creates heteroskedasticity,
Ringquist (2013) suggests weighting observations by the standard error of the effect size.
Parameter estimates from the fixed- and random-effects panel models are measured on the
scale of the partial correlation coefficient and should be interpreted as the average change
in effect size associated with a one-unit increase in a given moderator variable (Ringquist,
2013).
First we examine the fixed-effects results, which show the correlation between school
quality and housing prices is statistically significantly higher for studies that examined
school outputs (primary or secondary school test scores or value added). This implies that
people are eager to migrate to localities with higher school outputs, thereby raising housing
prices. The correlation is also higher for studies that examined educational expenditures
and school peer effects. Additionally, scholarly journal publication status and the ordinary
least squares estimator were found to increase the correlation between school quality and
property values. Interestingly, quasi-experimental methods have an insignificant effect on
the correlation. Quasi-experimental studies generally use regression discontinuity designs,
whereby boundary fixed effects are used to account for unobservable neighborhood characteristics. These methods have been deemed more robust than traditional methods that
account for neighboorhood traits through explanatory variables, as they allow for causal
inference.

31

Figure 2.2. Funnel Plots
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Next, we analyze the random-effects panel model. The results indicate the correlation
between school quality and property values is higher for all measures of school quality.
The results indicate the average correlation is 0.12 higher for studies that examined primary or secondary school test scores or value added, 0.16 higher for studies that examined
educational expenditures, and 0.11 higher for studies that examined peer effects. However,
the correlation is 0.04 lower for studies that additionally included school peer effects in
their overall model of school quality (e.g., school outputs and peer effects were included in
the same specification). This indicates that models which consider more than one type of
school quality including peer effects find that school quality does not get capitalized into
housing prices compared to models that consider only one type. The results also suggest
the presence of selection bias, as published studies tend to find a 0.07 higher correlation
between school quality and housing prices than unpublished studies.
To the overall effects, we add individual study effects. Together, they represent the hierarchical linear regression framework. The hierarchial structure suggests that the average
effect size by study is nested within the sample of overall effects. The first level of the
framework comprises single (or individual) effect sizes from each study level (i.e., we average the estimates by study to obtain one single estimate across each study). The second
level represents overall effect sizes. Variables with the prefix ‘a’ should be interpreted as
the individual study effect and those without the prefix as the overall effect. The overall
effects estimates are identical to the fixed-effects estimates as expected, since the first term
of Mundlak’s specification gives the within-estimate.
The results based on Mundlak’s specification indicate the correlation between school
quality and housing prices is 0.15 higher for studies that examined school outputs (note
this refers to the marginal effect based on 520 estimates reported by 48 studies). However,
the correlation is 0.004 higher for studies that also included school outputs in their overall
model of school quality. This indicates that models which consider more than one type
of school quality including school outputs find that school quality does not get capitalized
into housing prices as much as suggested by models that consider only one type. As before,
we find the coefficient on quasi-experimental methods is not statistically significant, which
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implies that quasi-experimental methods do not affect the correlation between school quality and housing prices. However, the correlation is actually 0.10 higher for studies that
employed ordinary least squares. Lastly, the results indicate the correlation is 0.13 higher
for published studies. This further corroborates that published studies tend to find higher
correlations than unpublished studies.
Because the fixed-effects model is unable to estimate the effects of explanatory variables that do not vary within studies, we adapt Mundlak’s methdology to the panel framework. By controlling for an average estimate of each moderator variable across studies, we
are able to draw more inferences about the correlation between school quality and housing prices. Specifically, we can calculate marginal effects to derive the true effects of the
moderator variables on the effect size, which we are unable to do with fixed effects (since
many variables are omitted due to perfect collinearity) and with random effects (which
maintains the impractical assumption of independence between moderator variables and
the unobserved effect).
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Table 2.3.: Estimation Results: Complete Sample of School Quality Measures
FE
Est.
−1.451
0.136∗∗∗
0.159∗∗∗
0.129∗∗∗
0.022
0.005
−0.010
0.142∗∗∗
0.001
−0.113
−3.0E-4
0.017
0.010
0.105∗∗∗
0.001

Std. Err.
4.268
0.036
0.036
0.036
0.038
0.005
0.008
0.037
0.002
0.142
0.004
0.129
0.013
0.010
0.035

RE
Est.
−3.811∗
0.124∗∗∗
0.156∗∗∗
0.108∗∗
0.026
0.002
−0.041∗∗∗
0.068∗∗∗
0.002∗
−0.108
8.3E-5
−0.087
0.008
0.083∗∗∗
0.010

Std. Err.
2.116
0.037
0.037
0.037
0.038
0.005
0.007
0.019
0.001
0.073
0.004
0.071
0.013
0.010
0.021

CRE
Est.
−1.451
0.136∗∗∗
0.159∗∗∗
0.129∗∗∗
0.022
0.005
−0.010
0.142∗∗∗
0.001
−0.113
−3.0E-4
0.017
0.010
0.105∗∗∗
0.001
−16.199∗∗
0.155
0.056
−0.034
−0.197∗
0.079
0.006
−0.082∗
0.008∗∗
−0.005
0.045∗∗∗
−0.093
0.113∗∗∗
−0.052∗
0.053
0.676
520

Std. Err.
4.530
0.038
0.039
0.038
0.040
0.005
0.008
0.039
0.002
0.150
0.004
0.137
0.013
0.011
0.038
5.057
0.132
0.077
0.098
0.088
0.049
0.034
0.041
0.003
0.162
0.012
0.149
0.032
0.026
0.040

intercept
schout
educexp
schpeer
schoutcond
schinpcond
schpeercond
journ
yrdata
rent
neighchar
logy
x2sls
ols
qexper
aintercept
aschout
aeducexp
aschpeer
aschoutcond
aschinpcond
aschpeercond
ajourn
ayrdata
arent
aneighchar
alogy
ax2sls
aols
aqexper
R2
0.396
0.319
N
520
520
1. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
2. Standard errors are clustered by study.
3. The dropped school quality variable represents pupil/teacher ratio.
4. No conditional school quality variables were dropped since they do not sum to 1.
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2.5.2. School Outputs and School Inputs Only
Table 2.3 provides an overall understanding of the effects of various school quality measures on housing prices. We learn three things: 1) all measures of school quality statistically
significant affect the correlation between school quality and housing prices; 2) published
studies tend to find a higher correlation than unpublished studies; and 3) quasi-experimental
methods have no effect on the correlation. One could say the inclusion of several different
school quality variables complicates the interpretation of the true effect size. Therefore,
we reduce the sample size to include only estimates derived from the regression of school
outputs (i.e., test scores and value-added measures) on housing prices (see Table 2.4). We
also do this for school inputs (i.e., educational expenditures and pupil/teacher ratio).
The estimation results presented in Table 2.4 are derived from models that used the
original β coefficient reported by primary studies, as the effect size. We present only the
results from the Mundlak specification (or CRE model presented in Table 2.3). Note that
we drop the school output conditional variable for the school output model and drop the
school input conditional model for the school input model. We notice the R2 for both
models are much lower than that presented in Table 2.3.
Hardly any of the explanatory variables are statistically significant. However, we can
still make some inferences. One, the school quality conditional measures are statistically
significant. Let us examine the school outputs model first. Note that these coefficients
are interpreted differently than the coefficients presented in Table 2.3, as we are using the
original β coefficients reported by the primary studies. The results indicate that studies
which control for school inputs tend to find a 6.71 percentage point higher effect of school
outputs on housing prices (note this refers to the marginal effect based on 339 estimates
reported by 32 studies which measured the effect of school outputs on housing prices).
As for the school inputs model, the results indicate that studies which control for school
outputs tend to find a 62 percentage point higher effect of school inputs on housing prices
(note this refers to the marginal effect based on 102 estimates reported by 25 studies which
measures the effect of school inputs on housing prices).
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Table 2.4.: Estimation Results: School Outputs (left) and School Inputs (right)
Est.
Std. Err.
Est.
Std. Err.
intercept
262.796
4960.357
6803.946 15645.868
schoutcond
−
−
−1.292
54.317
schinpcond
9.268
9.409
−
−
schpeercond
4.604
7.336
18.421
54.285
112.931
9385.943
journ
4.658
32.349
yrdata
−0.244
1.971
−3.110
6.309
rent
235.858
3000.851
−102.933
555.952
neighchar
−0.151
5.688
−563.356
659.111
logy
222.012
3000.471
−64.716
145.326
−0.733
30.201
x2sls
−1.743
12.696
ols
−1.812
10.963
−0.232
15.505
−373.293
352.402
qexper
3.420
31.113
3140.676 17579.151
aintercept
2358.866
5199.948
aschoutcond
−
−
258.122∗
146.648
∗
aschinpcond −27.141
14.456
−
−
25.227
90.172
aschpeercond −2.164
10.499
ajourn
22.419
32.459
−71.704
9348.940
ayrdata
−1.069
2.114
−1.975
7.327
372.146
736.710
arent
−214.422
3006.037
aneighchar
−0.800
10.172
503.027
724.329
alogy
−224.547
3005.604
65.194
173.462
−271.423∗∗
86.855
ax2sls
−35.906
24.736
aols
−10.418
18.778
53.930
124.425
aqexper
9.267
31.631
399.411
412.689
2
R
0.209
0.263
N
339
102
1. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
2. Standard errors are clustered by study.
3. Note the effect size, or the dependent variable, is the original β reported
by each primary study.

2.6. Summary and Conclusions
This meta-regression analysis examines the effect of school quality on housing prices
from various angles. Reasons for the numerous categorizations of school quality include
availability of data and difficulty of defining what makes a “good” school. It is not easy to
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determine the factors involved in a student’s academic success. Homebuyers may be willing
to pay a premium for improved student performance. Perhaps they are willing to pay more
based on higher educational expenditures or high school graduation rates. Maybe parents
move to other localities based on the socioeconomic composition of the students. Since
school quality has been measured in various ways, it is difficult to accurately determine the
extent to which people with school-age children value education. This has led to improper
interpretation of the true effect of school quality on property values.
We pool data from 48 North American and European studies and separate school quality into different categories: primary school test scores, secondary school test scores, value
added, expenditures per pupil, pupil/teacher ratio and peer racial and socioeconomic composition. We estimate fixed-, random- and correlated random-effects panel meta-regression
models of the correlation between school quality and housing prices. We contribute to the
meta-regression literature by adapting Mundlak’s (1979) framework for identifying overall
and individual study effects to hierarchical linear models.
Our estimation results show that studies which examined school outputs, school inputs
or peer effects find a higher correlation between overall school quality and housing prices,
where school outputs have the most statistically and economically significant impact. Published studies tend to find a higher correlation than unpublished studies. Additionally, we
find that quasi-experimental methods have no effect on the relationship. As for the models with only school outputs or school inputs, we find that controlling for other measures
of school quality increases the capitalization of both school outputs and school inputs in
housing prices.
While meta-regression methods aid in identifying the factors that cause discrepancies
among analogous studies, they sometimes prevent one from inferring something meaningful. Our use of correlation coefficients further complicates things. However, we move
the discussion of whether school quality affects housing prices further than if we examine just one or two measures of school quality. Clearly, different measures have different
impacts on housing prices. While school inputs and outputs tend to positively influence
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housing prices, peer effects generally tend to have the opposite effect. Our study uses
meta-regression analysis to bridge the gap among those three groups.
Let us focus on school outputs, which have been used frequently by researchers in
understanding the relationship between school quality and housing prices. While some
studies have found that test scores and value-added measures have no effect on housing
prices, we find that they clearly do. The result is not only robust across the specifications,
but it also controls for school inputs and peer effects. This may provide some guidance
to educational policymakers, whose goal is to provide a public service for students to gain
knowledge, acquire beneficial skills and succeed. As schools become more competitive in
producing future intellectuals, school officials need to develop better schooling methods.
It is important to note that meta-regression methods are not without complications. As
stated above, previous studies have used vastly different measures of school quality, sample
sizes that range from few school districts to the entire nation and estimators to account for
potential biases. Our use of moderator variables and correlation coefficients helps bridge
those gaps. However, other methods such as constructing an index to account for school
quality variation may be useful for meta-regression analysis. An index that weights school
quality and corresponding school quality controls by prevalence across studies may produce different results.
The next chapter examines educational expenditures as the sole measure of school quality. As the meta-regression analysis reveals that studies which measured school quality
with school spending found a positive correlation with housing prices, we conduct our own
research on inmigration to U.S. counties.
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CHAPTER 3. DO PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ON SCHOOLING AFFECT WHERE
PEOPLE MOVE?

3.1. Introduction
Individuals migrate in response to economic incentives and move from one locality to
another upon weighing the benefits of moving against the costs (Bowles, 1970). The potential migrant is assumed to select the locality at which the value of the expected net benefit
that accrues to him from migration is the greatest, that is, at which he maximizes his utility. The framework most often associated with such behavior is the Tiebout model (1956),
which states that voters reveal their preferences for public goods by locating in jurisdictions
that offer them an optimal mix of expenditures and taxes. This research uses the Tiebout
framework to address whether school quality, as measured by educational expenditures,
influences location choices.
In the context of Tiebout, educational expenditures should positively and significantly
affect people’s decisions to migrate. Concurrently, property taxes should negatively influence people’s decisions to move to another locality. However, note that Tiebout’s (1956)
has limitations. For example, poorer people have fewer financial resources with which to
move from their current locality to another. Property value and migration models have been
used to determine the validity of the Tiebout hypothesis of consumer location with respect
to preferences for local public goods and taxes (Pack, 1973; Liu, 1977; Cebula and Alexander, 2006; Cebula and Nair-Reichert, 2012). Schools in the United States are funded largely
by local property taxes. In fact, state and local governments provide about 93 percent of
educational funds in the U.S. (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013).
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The movement of people to localities with high educational expenditures implies that
they place value on school quality when making their destination choices. Oftentimes, localities with high property values house schools with high educational expenditures. Residents of those localities are wealthier and can afford higher property taxes to support
their local schools than residents of poorer localities. Wealthy individuals tend to select
themselves into wealthy localities and thereby financially support their local schools. This
makes educational expenditures endogenous in our study of the effect of school quality on
location choice. Therefore, estimates of regression models that fail to consider the sorting
behavior of migrants may be biased. Propensity score matching techniques (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Imbens, 2000) have been used to effectively
remove endogeneity bias between confounding variables (i.e., nonrandomly assigned binary treatment) and the outcome of interest. Hirano and Imbens (2004) generalize the
binary treatment propensity score by permitting the treatment group to have non-discrete
values. The continuous nature of educational expenditures makes Hirano and Imbens’ generalized propensity score (GPS) technique appropriate for this study.
The purpose of this chapter is to remove the endogeneity bias between educational expenditures and inmigration with generalized propensity score methods. In so doing, we
estimate an outcome equation for inmigration conditional on an estimated treatment equation for educational expenditures. We restrict our focus to the population aged 25–49 years
to examine the location choices of those likely to have school-aged children. We examine
inmigration of U.S. counties during the period 2006–2010 and find that per pupil expenditures on education generally positively influence inmigration. However, we find specific
thresholds beyond which educational expenditures no longer appear to increasingly affect
inmigration. The estimation results reveal that inmigration increases with expenditures up
to about $7,000, but there remains a generally flat effect beyond that. This result provides
some guidance for public school officials looking to increase their school spending.
The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes relevant literature on the
role of educational expenditures on migration patterns. Section 3.3 describes generalized
propensity score methods used to remove endogeneity bias. Section 3.4 describes the data
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sample and relevant variable characteristics. Section 3.5 provides a discussion of empirical
results, and section 3.6 provides the conclusion.

3.2. Background
Several studies have examined the effect of educational expenditures on migration rate.
Charney (1993) notes that educational services, provided by state and local governments
as an investment in human capital, can either attract new capital or stimulate the outmigration of trained individuals. Cebula (1977) assumes that rapidly growing public education
budgets imply stronger efforts to improve public education, although he does not examine
the effect of expenditures on migration patterns directly. Likewise, Quan and Beck (1987)
find the effects of educational expenditures on wages and employment differ in the Northeast and Sunbelt but do not examine the effect of expenditures on migration directly. Early
migration research uses per capita government outlays for public education (Pack, 1973;
Conway and Houtenville, 1998; Gale and Heath, 2000) perhaps due to availability of data.
Current research generally uses per pupil expenditures to understand the decision-making
behavior of migrants (Cebula and Alexander; 2006; Cebula and Nair-Reichert, 2012) but
largely fails to recognize the potential endogeneity problem between expenditures and location choice.
Researchers have used quasi-experimental techniques to study endogeneous relationships between variables of interest. McMillen and McDonald (2002) study the effect of
land-use zoning on market allocations of land between commercial and residential properties in Chicago. They note the potential endogeneity of land-use zoning decisions resulting
from the greater likelihood of city blocks with high land-value growth rates to be zoned
residential. Upon controlling for that endogeneity through difference-in-differences, the
authors find that residential zoning leads to higher land values than commercial zoning.
Alecke et al. (2011) study the impact of public funding of private sector research and development activity across East Germany. They recognize a two-fold selection problem:
policymakers may award grants to firms that are more likely to produce successful re-
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search projects and firms who are sucessful at conducting research projects are more likely
to apply for corresponding grants. Using propensity score matching, they find that public
subsidies for research and development lead to additional private research and development
expenditures relative to firm sales. Subsequently, subsidized firms are more likely to apply
for patents than their nonsubsidized counterparts.
While propensity score matching has been used widely to tackle endogeneity, its use is
limited to model specifications with binary treatments. Hirano and Imbens (2004) extend
the binary propensity score matching technique (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Imbens,
2000) by permitting the treatment group to have non-discrete values. Since Hirano and Imbens (2004), several researchers have implemented generalized propensity score methods
to their work. For example, Kluve et al. (2012) find that training programs longer than
100 days do not provide additional aid for German workers. Bia and Mattei (2012) examine the effect of financial aid on local firms in Italy. They apply GPS methods to remove
biases across differing amounts of financial aid and find the amount of financial aid positively influences firms’ employment policies. Becker et al. (2012) study transfer of grants
to disadvantaged regions of European Union member states. Considerable heterogeneity
among the amounts granted to those regions makes the use of GPS methods appropriate.
The authors find discrepancies among the allocation of funds (i.e., they find the maximum
transfer of grants of 1.3 percent of a region’s GDP leads to positive income growth while
other values have no effect) across the target regions and conclude that reallocation of those
funds may spur greater income growth.
The application of GPS to educational institutions has been explored less frequently
than the aforementioned topics, which comprise the overall literature on policy intervention
and regional/economic development. Doyle (2011) studies the oft-reported higher student
transfer from community college to four-year institutions and completition rates of students
who attend full-time (and thereby take more academic credits) rather than part-time. He
uses GPS methods to reduce bias between the number of academic credits students take and
their transfer rates from community college to a four-year institution. Using academic cred-

43
its as the continuous treatment, Doyle (2011) finds a linear relationship between number of
credits taken and student transfer to a four-year institution.

3.3. Method
Wealthy migrants tend to sort themselves into localities with better schools, which often receive revenues through local property taxes. Schools accrue higher taxes from affluent neighborhoods (as their residents are more able to afford those taxes) than from less
wealthy neighborhoods. In essence, migrants sort themselves into neighborhoods that satisfy their optimal bundle of taxes and public expenditures, a large portion of which sustain
the school district. This creates endogeneity and confounds the relationship between educational expenditures and people’s migration to a county. We use the generalized propensity score or GPS technique (Hirano and Imbens, 2004) to eliminate any biases associated
with educational expenditures and migrants’ destination choices. GPS generalizes the binary propensity score matching technique (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Imbens, 2000)
by permitting the treatment group to have non-discrete values. The continuous nature of
educational expenditures makes GPS suitable for this research.
We follow Hirano and Imbens’ primary assumption of weak unconfoundedness, which
does not require joint independence of all potential outcomes (i.e., inmigration rates) but
instead requires conditional independence of each value (i.e., U.S. counties indexed by i =
1, . . . , N) of the treatment (i.e., educational expenditures) given the vector of covariates Xi
(i.e., county characteristics). This assumption implies that all variables which affect both
inmigration rate and educational expenditures are observed.
GPS further requires the balancing property, which ensures the mean differences of
the covariates in one treatment level do not statistically significantly differ from the mean
differences of the covariates across the other treatment levels. The balancing property, in
combination with unconfoundedness, implies that assignment to treatment is unconfounded
given the GPS (see Hirano and Imbens, 2004 for their proof of weak unconfoundedness).
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Note that the assignment to treatment interval is user-specified and used to verify the balancing property of the GPS (we provide details of the treatment intervals in section 3.5).
Hirano and Imbens (2004) use two steps to prove that GPS can be used to eliminate
any biases associated with differences in the covariates. First, they estimate the conditional
expectation of the outcome as a function of the treatment level and the GPS. Second, they
average that conditional expectation over the GPS at a particular level of the treatment to
estimate the dose-response function (see Hirano and Imbens, 2004 for their proof of bias
removal with GPS).

3.3.1. Generalized Propensity Score
We consider the following model:

T = Xβ + µ

(3.1)

where T refers to the treatment, X refers to a vector of covariates used to explain the treatment and µ are independently and identically distributed errors. Practical implementation
of GPS requires estimation of the treatment as a function of its covariates (see Table 3.1 for
descriptions of the relevant variables) given the normal distribution:
T |X ∼ N(β 0 X, σ 2 )

(3.2)

We then assess the validity of the assumed normal distribution. In case one of the
goodness-of-fit tests (e.g., Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-Francia, Shapiro-Wilk) fails, it
is advised to try a different transformation of the treatment variable. Note the regression
function (3.1) does not have causal interpretation. Instead, the idea behind estimating (3.1)
is to collect and use the β s and σ 2 in the estimation of the GPS as follows:


1
0
2
R̂ = √
exp − √
(T − β̂ X)
2πσ 2
2σ̂ 2
1

(3.3)
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We use the estimated GPS (equation 3.3) to investigate the balance of the covariates
(i.e., we verify the balancing property). We divide county-level educational expenditures
into four intervals at the 25th percentile. Following Hirano and Imbens (2004), we investigate covariate balance by testing whether the mean of each covariate in one of the four
treatment groups is different from the mean in the other three treatment groups combined.
The balancing property also requires evaluation of the GPS at some user-specified “representative” point of the treatment and “blocking” of that GPS value by a user-specified
number of blocks. We choose the median of the treatment and 10 blocks at the 10th percentile, respectively.
Upon testing the balancing property, we estimate the conditional expectation of the
outcome Y, given the treatment T, and the generalized propensity score R. We estimate a
cubic approximation of the outcome and propensity score (i.e., we include first-, secondand third-order moments of educational expenditures and generalized propensity score and
their interaction, and we log the generalized propensity score and its moments following
Hirano and Imbens, 2004) as follows:
E[Y |T, R] = α0 + α1 T + α2 T 2 + α3 T 3 + α4 R + α5 R2 + α6 R3 + α7 T R

(3.4)

Given the estimates of the outcome equation (i.e., α̂ parameters), we average the outcome function over the four user-specified treatment intervals as:

1 n
d
E[Y
(t)] = ∑ (α̂0 + α̂1t + α̂2t 2 + α̂3t 3 + α̂4 r̂(t, X) + α̂5 r̂(t, X)2 + α̂6 r̂(t, X)3 + αˆ7t r̂(t, X))
N i=1
(3.5)
where t refers to the treatment level. Once we estimate the average outcome at each treatment interval, we derive an estimate of the complete dose-response function.

46
3.4. Data
The United States Census Bureau provides USA counties data file downloads compiled
from various sources including previous years’ Census, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Center of Education Statistics and United States Department of Agriculture. Table
3.1 presents variables and descriptive statistics. Below we discuss the outcome, treatment
and control variables.

CENSUS

educexp

income
democrat
nonwhite
BA+
65+

rural–urban

private
tax

USDAERS

NCES

CENSUS

inmigration

migration

Data
Source
CENSUS

Variables
total number of inmigrants aged 25–49 to
county j from 2006–2010 as fraction of
2006 population aged 25–49
natural log of per pupil expenditures for
public elementary and secondary education 2006, weighted by school district enrollment
median housing income 2006 ($1,000s)
percent people who voted Democrat 2008
percent nonwhite 2006
percent people with BA+ 2005-2009
percent housing units with people 65+
2010
net domestic migration 2005-2006
(1,000s)
number of private schools
per capita property tax 2006-2007
(1,000s)
=1 to 9 based on USDA-ERS’ 2013 rural–
urban continuum codes

Definition

5.109

8.867
1.081

0.002

40.544
41.509
13.087
18.675
28.550

9.049

0.023

Mean

2.681

32.627
3.598

7.225

10.454
13.827
15.420
8.520
5.352

0.207

0.015

Std. Dev.

Table 3.1.: Variable Definitions and Data Sources

1

9

1062
126.271

69.386

−248.723
0
0

100.772
92.5
90.7
69.5
63.65

11.574

0.169

Max

16.986
4.9
0
4.6
11.09

8.493

0

Min
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3.4.1. Outcome Variable
To construct our outcome variable, we aggregate the number of inmigrants for each
county. We choose inmigrants rather than net migrants although many have examined net
migration as the dependent variable (Sjaastad, 1962; Miller, 1973; Belanger and Rogers,
1992; Rogers and Henning, 1999). It is important to separate the effect of in- and outmigration as net migration hides important underlying directional channels of migration
flows. The inmigration rate, given as the inmigration level divided by the destination population, is typically used since many dimensions of the benefits and costs of moving cannot
be accounted for based on a simple flow. Therefore, we use population to convert inmigration to a rate. We assign values of 0 for missing observations since those data may truly be
0 or may be so small that data for those counties is not reported for confidentiality reasons.
We calculate the inmigration rate as the total number of inmigrants aged 25–49 to
county j over the period 2006–2010 as a percent of the 2006 population aged 25–49 in
county j. That is, we divide the total number of inmigrants from 2006 to 2010 by the 2006
population in the destination county, as 2006 is the beginning of the study period. We
choose the population aged 25–49, as this age group is more likely to have school-age children than other age groups. Restriction on age has been used by other researchers (Graves,
1979; Greenwood, 1988), who find that from their peak at about 25 years of age, migration rates decline steadily until about 65 years of age. After 65 years, the elderly may be
less supportive of expenditures for education, especially those who have recently migrated
and may ”lack a strong commitment to their new communities” (Conway and Houtenville,
2001).
The average inmigration rate over the study period is 0.02 or 2 percent. Figure 3.1 illustrates that counties in the tenth percentile and lower generally comprise the northern and
midwestern regions of the U.S. Counties in the fiftieth percentile and higher generally comprise the western and southern regions of the U.S. Counties in the ninety-ninth percentile
appear randomly across the southern part of the U.S., with noticeably significant clustering
in the southern-most part of the center of the nation. We infer that a smaller fraction of the
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population migrated to the northern and midwestern regions during the 2006–2010 period
than to the western and southern regions.

Figure 3.1. Spatial Distribution of Inmigration Rates

3.4.2. Treatment Variable
We use school district-level per pupil expenditures and average them across counties.
Because U.S. counties are of different sizes and thus differ in the number of school districts,
we weight per pupil expenditures by school district enrollment. This method aligns with
the relevant literature that uses per pupil expenditures for education to account for student
enrollment and school size. Additionally, we assign the mean of educational expenditures
to observations with missing data. The distribution of per pupil educational expenditures is
skewed leftward, with a skewness of 28.01. Therefore, we use the natural log of expenditures, which has a skewness of –1.34.
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Figure 3.2. Spatial Distribution of Educational Expenditures

The average logged per pupil educational expenditures is 8.93. Figure 3.2 shows that
counties in the tenth percentile and lower largely comprise the midwestern and western
regions. Counties in the fiftieth percentile and higher are more scattered across the nation,
with several clusters across the midwestern and eastern regions. These clusters illustrate
the possiblity of spatial correlation across counties and indicate that characteristics of a
county depend on its neighboring counties.
We note that some school districts have unusually high per pupil educational spending
amounts for three reasons. 1) They may have low enrollment (less than 50 or 100). School
districts may be educating students at least part-time that are not reflected in their enrollment counts. This happens more in vocational districts that educate students from other
school districts for part of the day. Therefore, those types of districts would have higher per
pupil current spending. 2) Some districts, especially rural, may spend disproportionately
high amounts on student transportation which, if in districts with low enrollment counts,
will result in high per pupil current spending amounts. 3) Districts with high costs of living
may have higher per pupil expenditures due to teacher salaries and wages. We estimate the
models both with and without the outliers of school districts with fewer than 50 students.
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However, the results do not cause any major statistical differences, and we therefore do not
omit outliers in the analysis reported below.

3.4.3. Control Variables
Three classes of determinants are often used to explain educational expenditures. The
first class comprises socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population.
Characteristics such as age, education and race often influence people’s willingness to support educational expenditures. The second class comprises characteristics of the school
system, which include private school alternatives to public education. The third class comprises geographic variables to identify each region.
We hypothesize that several key population characteristics influence the level of educational expenditures. One is median income, which provides a general indicator of county
wealth. Counties with greater wealth may afford higher educational expenditures than
those with less wealth and thereby, prefer to migrate to those localities. McMahon (1970)
states income as the most important economic determinant of educational expenditures.
Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) likewise find that income is an important determinant of
spending per student. Specifically, they find that a given percentage change in income
leads to an equivalent percentage increase in per pupil spending. While others have used
alternative measures such as average income (see, e.g., Pommerehne, 1978; Gramlich and
Rubinfeld, 1982; Gerber and Lewis, 2004), we prefer median income as the most representative measure of county wealth to avoid using the mean income of counties with extreme
distributions of income (i.e., very rich or very poor).
Another key variable is the percent of the population who voted Democrat during the
2008 national election, which provides an indicator of economic times. People often make
decisions to support political parties and indirectly, educational expenditures based on their
own economic well-being. De Neve (2011) states that as income growth contracts, people
view expenditures as burdensome and tend to avoid higher taxes and public spending, characteristic of Republican views. This implies the presence of more Democrats during the
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2008 election would lead to higher educational expenditures, while the presence of more
Republicans would lead to the opposite.
Personal characteristics such as race and education (Schwartz, 1973; Kodrzycki, 2001)
significantly affect the size of county educational expenditures. We use the number of
nonwhite residents as a percentage of the total population during 2006 to reflect racial diversity across counties. Additionally, we include the percent of county population with
a Bachelor’s degree or higher. Individuals with higher education tend to desire competitive educational opportunities for their children and prefer “good” schools as measured by
educational expenditures.
Other demographic characteristics such as age are explored frequently across the literature. For example, the population aged 65 and over may feel that school-age children
receive greater public benefits than themselves and push to shift public resources away
from education (Harris et al., 2001). Contrarily, the elderly may support public education to improve younger workers’ productivity and wages, which can be taxed to fund
transfer payments to senior citizens, and to accrue greater value to their homes through
higher spending on education (Poterba, 1998). We include the percent of housing units
with people over the age of 65 to account for their varied preferences toward educational
expenditures compared to younger cohorts. Some studies find a negative relationship between the elderly population and acceptance of larger school expenditures (Poterba, 1997;
Muir and Schneider, 1999; Hilber and Mayer, 2002; Cattaneo and Wolter, 2009). Cattaneo and Wolter (2009) strictly find the elderly Swiss are less willing to spend money on
education. Hilber and Mayer (2002) hypothesize the elderly may have a negative effect on
public school expenditure specifically in locations where school spending is not strongly
related to housing values. Harris et al. (2001) and Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) find the
elderly have only a modest negative effect on school district educational expenditures. On
the other hand, Deller and Walzer (1993) find that communities with a larger population
of retirees are just as likely to support increased property taxes for education as communities with a smaller population. Similarly, Plutzer and Berkman (2005) find that support
for educational spending has increased remarkably, contrary to previous inferences that the
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elderly, who often do not have school-age children and have fixed incomes, do not support
increased educational spending.
Lastly, change in population size affects the makeup of the population and the willingness of residents to support school expenditures. We include net domestic migration during
2005–2006, the period immediately preceeding our study period, to account for population
change. Migration to an area has implications for the type of educational finance support
residents are able to provide. Regions with high poverty are less likely to attract migrants
with school-age children than regions with less poverty, as those regions may have fewer
or lesser-quality educational resources. McGranahan et al. (2010) examine the relationship
between poverty and net outmigration and find that counties with poverty rates exceeding
25 percent (i.e., greater than 25 percent of residents are impoverished) also have high net
outmigration. Over their study period, McGranahan et al. find that counties which attract young families with children continue to do so until retirement age. This implies that
positive net domestic migration should positively affect educational expenditures.
In addition to socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population, we
expect attributes of the school system within the county to influence educational expenditures. For example, Epple and Romano (1996) find the presence of private alternatives to
public services influences the extent to which residents support public school expenditures.
Therefore, we include the number of private school alternatives as an explanatory variable.
We also include per capita property taxes for the academic year 2006–2007 to account
for local revenue. The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) provides data on
property taxes during 2006–2007. We divide total property taxes by resident population to
derive per capita property taxes for the period.
Finally, we expect geographic variables to influence educational expenditures. The
concept of urbanization has become important particularly in the context of migration, as
the percentage of the U.S. population living in nonmetro areas has declined from 21 percent
in 1990 to 16 percent today (USDA, ERS, 2013). The definition of urban/rural has changed
over time, and researchers continue to use different measures (e.g., Isserman, 2005). We
prefer USDA-ERS’ nonmetro/metro classification (2013) defined on the basis of counties,
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our spatial unit of observation. We construct and include a binary variable for whether a
county is urban based on the nine-point classification by USDA-ERS (i.e., 1–3 indicate
measures of urbanity and 4–9 indicate measures of rurality). We exclude the States of
Hawaii and Alaska, as they are not part of the contiguous U.S.

3.5. Results
We begin our analysis with the traditional migration model, without the use of generalized propensity score methods. Then, we examine the effectiveness of the GPS technique
to remove endogeneity. We discuss the balance of covariates used to explain educational
expenditures and the conditional expectation of inmigration given the treatment and the
generalized propensity score.

3.5.1. Traditional migration model
Results from the traditional migration model (Table 3.2) reveal that educational expenditures do not statistically significantly affect inmigration. The number of private schools
deters migration to a county, providing an indicator for educational preferences. Additionally, inmigration rises with median housing income, indicating that wealthier people may
be more inclined to migrate to another county. Income has implications for economic stability, and those with high levels of income may have more financial flexibility to migrate
to another county. A majority of the population variables are significant. The negative sign
on percent of households with people aged 65 and over indicates that parents of school-age
children, often within the 25–49 age group, prefer not to migrate to counties with senior
citizens.
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Table 3.2.: Estimation Results of Migration Equation
Est.
Std. Err.
∗∗∗
intercept
0.034
0.003
educexp
0.037
0.098
∗
income
0.001
4.0E-4
∗∗∗
democrat
−0.145
0.022
nonwhite
0.188∗∗∗
0.020
∗
BA+
0.111
0.044
∗∗∗
65+
−0.350
0.060
migration
−0.002
0.004
∗∗
private
−0.003
0.001
tax
0.001
0.001
∗∗∗
rural–urban −0.581
0.131
2
R
0.088
N
3109
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.

3.5.2. Generalized propensity score estimation
The first step requires estimation of the treatment equation. The goodness-of-fit measure R2 is 0.23. All nine of the covariates are statistically significant (Table 3.3). Race
and education are found to positively and statistically significantly influence school spending. The latter result is consistent with the notion that people with higher education are
more likely to support educational expenditures for their children and future generations.
Domestic migration leads to lower spending, implying that population change alters the
makeup of a county’s residents and thereby influences their willingness to support educational expenditures. Private schools also lead to lower spending, which may be the result
of competition. Private schools may persuade people to migrate to a county, depending on
their preferences for primary and secondary education. The greater the number of private
school alternatives to public education, the more choices that parents of school-age children have. Public school officials may modify their resources due to possible outmigration
of students from their schools.
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Table 3.3.: Estimation Results of Treatment Equation
Est.
Std. Err.
∗∗∗
intercept
8.392
0.035
income
0.002∗∗∗
0.001
∗∗∗
democrat
0.002
2.8E-4
∗
nonwhite
0.001
2.5E-4
BA+
0.007∗∗∗
0.001
∗∗∗
65+
0.008
0.001
∗∗∗
migration
−0.057
0.005
private
−0.005∗∗∗
0.001
∗∗∗
tax
0.010
0.001
rural–urban
0.018∗∗∗
0.002
2
R
0.226
N
3109
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.

3.5.2.1. Balancing covariates of the generalized propensity score
We use the software package R to estimate the generalized propensity score. While
STATA has user packages to compute those values, they are limited in scope. Therefore,
we construct our own program using R and compare our estimation results to those derived
from STATA’s “gpscore” program (Bia and Mattei, 2008).
We investigate the balance of nine covariates by testing whether the mean in one of
the four treatment groups is different from the mean in the other three treatment groups
combined (i.e., we compare each treatment group with its complement of the remaining
treatment groups). We calculate t-statistics for the mean differences of each of the covariates and of each of the four treatment groups. Figure 3.3 shows t-statistics for each
treatment group for each covariate. Many of the t-statistics lie above 0, and specifically, 26
of the 36 t-statistics are greater than 1.96, indicating notable lack of balance.
We show GPS-adjusted t-statistics below the unadjusted statistics (Figure 3.3). We test
the balance of the GPS-adjusted covariates by evaluating the GPS at the median value of
educational expenditures for each treatment group. We divide the expenditures into four intervals at the 25th percentile. The intervals range as follows: [8.493, 8.922], [8.922, 9.009],
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Figure 3.3. Unadjusted (top) and GPS-adjusted t-statistics (bottom)
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[9.009, 9.137] and [9.137, 11.574] with 777 observations each across the first three intervals and 778 in the fourth interval. We use the median value of educational expenditures
by treatment interval to block on the GPS score, as recommended by Hirano and Imbens
(2004). We use 10 blocks, meaning that we divide the GPS into tenths based on whether
it belongs to treatment interval 1, 2, 3 or 4. The balance of the covariates is improved by
adjusting for GPS. After the adjustment, 19 t-statistics are larger than 1.96 compared to 26
prior to adjustment. While several t-statistics remain statistically significant after adjustment for GPS, many of their magnitudes are much reduced. For example, the t-statistic
for property tax declines from 5.1 to 2.5 and from 6.6 to 5.3 across the first and second
intervals, respectively. Similarly, the t-statistic for rural–urban declines from 7.5 to 0.39,
4.6 to 2.2, 3.1 to 2.5 and 8.0 to 2.4, across the four intervals, respectively.

3.5.2.2. Estimation of the dose-response function
After adjusting the covariates for balance, we estimate the outcome equation given
the treatment following Hirano and Imbens (2004) and the generalized propensity score.
Specifically, we estimate the conditional expectation of inmigration given the treatment
and the generalized propensity score, first-, second- and third-order moments and an interaction term.1 Table 3.4 presents the estimates of the outcome equation. Note there is
no direct meaning associated with the estimated coefficients. The estimated coefficients of
the generalized propensity score (i.e., GPS, GPS2 , GPS3 and trGPS) generally should be
statistically significant, however, and our estimates verify this.

1 For

the treatment, we use level and not log following Hirano and Imbens (2004).
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Table 3.4.: Estimation Results of Outcome Equation
Est.
Std. Err.
intercept
0.007
0.006
tr
1.368∗
0.608
tr2
−30.569
20.482
tr3
188.833
150.182
GPS
0.024∗∗
0.008
∗
GPS2
−0.013
0.006
∗
GPS3
0.003
0.002
trGPS
−0.993∗∗∗
0.256
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.

The last step of Hirano and Imbens’ (2004) procedure requires the estimation of the
dose-response function, which gives the relationship between per pupil educational expenditures and the inmigration rate. Upon estimating the outcome equation, we take the
estimated coefficients from Table 3.4 and plug them into equation 3.5 (see section 3.3).
To calculate the dose-response function, we average the estimated outcome function over
the generalized propensity score evaluated at each treatment level (see Figure 3.4). Per
pupil educational expenditures are labeled along the x-axis and inmigration rates (i.e., total
number of inmigrants aged 25–49 to county j during 2006–2010 as a percent of the 2006
population aged 25–49) are labeled along the y-axis. We include 95 percent confidence
intervals, which are based on 1,000 bootstrap replications, taking into account estimation
of the GPS.2
The dose-response function reveals that inmigration rate is approximately 1.4 at educational expenditures of $5,000. This means that approximately 1.4 percent of a county’s
population migrated to that county due to educational expenditures of $5,000. The inmigration rate increases to about 1.9 at educational expenditures of $6,000 and about 2.3
at educational expenditures of $7,000. The results indicate that inmigration to a county
increases with educational expenditures up to $7,000. Higher levels of educational expenditures beyond $7,000 do not lead to higher levels of inmigration. However, the flat
2 The

code for the generalized propensity score model is presented in Appendix A.
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but positive trend beyond educational expenditures of $7,000 implies that higher levels of
expenditures do not lead to outmigration.

Figure 3.4. Dose-Response Function

The tendency of inmigration to increase with educational expenditures confirms the
positive relationship found by previous studies. However, we advance the literature by
finding a specific threshold beyond which educational expenditures appear to have a flat
effect on inmigration.

3.6. Summary and Conclusions
This analysis examines the effect of school quality, as measured by educational expenditures, on inmigration. We attempt to tackle the endogeneity problem between educational
expenditures and destination choice by employing Hirano and Imbens’ (2004) generalized
propensity score technique.
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The results align with most prior research that has analyzed fiscal determinants of migration. We find that per pupil expenditures on education generally positively influence inmigration, consistent with previous research. Additionally, our results align with Tiebout’s
(1956) ideology that voters reveal their preferences for public goods by locating in areas
that offer them their desired expenditures. In other words, inmigration should increase with
educational expenditures. However, we find a specific threshold beyond which educational
expenditures no longer appear to positively affect inmigration and, instead appear to have
a flat effect. The estimation results reveal that inmigration increases with expenditures up
to about $7,000 but generally remains flat beyond that. This result provides some guidance
for public school officials looking to increase their public school spending on primary and
secondary education. Officials may attract the average inmigrant by increasing their current
per pupil spending amounts to $7,000.
One limitation of the study is the availability of appropriate school-district level data
for not only educational expenditures, but also for sociodemographic, economic and geographic variables. While the latter variables are available at the county level, they are
not readily available at lower levels of spatial aggregation for the entire nation. Because
of this, we used weighting methods to equate school-district level expenditure data and
county-level migration data. The availability of comprehensive school-district level data
would allow for better examination of school funding in the U.S.
Future work aims to extend the generalized propensity score technique to include spatial effects. Spatial interactions are often thought to exist among local governments. Local
governments affect each other in their public spending decisions such that one local government has a spillover effect on its neighbor. Local governments often finance public
spending through property taxes. Therefore, they value how their tax rates and local public
expenditures compare to neighboring jurisdictions. Local governments prefer not to drive
away their taxpayers with high tax increases compared to their neighbors. Additionally,
migration is autoregressive by nature. People’s destination choices may be influenced by
family and friends who have moved to and settled in a particular region.
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As such, there remain several points for consideration. One is the possibility of estimating the dose-response function of the GPS technique using the spatial lag model such that
one’s migration to an area based on its educational expenditures affects another’s migration
to an area based on its expenditures. The presence of spatial dependence and/or heterogeneity among regions provides reason for estimating the dose-response function with spatial
effects. Additionally, one may add a spatially lagged version of the estimated GPS to the
dose-response function, which would then follow the spatial Durbin structure with lagged
dependent and independent variables.
The following chapter examines educational tax referenda, a mechanism used by school
districts to obtain additional school funding through property tax increases approved by voters. As this chapter’s results indicate, inmigration increases with educational expenditures
up to about $7,000 but remains flat beyond that. This has implications for voter decisions
to support property tax increases. Specifically, the result that inmigration to a county increases up to expenditures of $7,000 manifests in higher home values as the added demand
for education capitalizes into housing prices. As the surrounding community residents benefit from increased value to their homes, they may be more likely to support property tax
increases proposed by school district officials. However, as inmigration does not positively
increase beyond educational expenditures of $7,000, residents may no longer accrue the
benefits of higher property values and therefore may not vote for higher property taxes.
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CHAPTER 4. MORE MONEY FOR SCHOOLS: EDUCATION TAX REFERENDA’S
RURAL–URBAN DIVIDE1

4.1. Introduction
Public school finance in the United States is complex. The United States Constitution
does not delegate the power over education to the U.S., thus leaving education to the individual states. According to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), the U.S
government provides less than 10 percent of funding for Kindergarten through grade 12 (K12), whereas the bulk of funding comes from state and local governments. Whereas state
governments collect income and sales taxes to fund education, local governments often
resort to property taxes.
The educational funding structure generates stark disparities between rich and poor
states or communities and drives people’s locational choices. Where people move is thus
strongly influenced by their preferences for public spending on education. As an alternative to the implied “voting with their feet” (Tiebout, 1956), school districts may propose
referenda to obtain additional funds through property taxes. Education tax referenda can
therefore be used as a powerful instrument to challenge the status quo of educational funding in a community. However, while many school districts have taken advantage of this
funding strategy, more have not.
This chapter focuses on rural–urban differences in utilizing education referenda. The
focus on rural–urban differences is motivated by many rural communities losing their
young, better-educated population to urban areas and thereby depleting local resources
1 This

chapter is based on a paper written jointly with Dr. Brigitte Waldorf and Dr. Raymond Florax, which
is currently under review at the Journal of Rural Studies, and a paper written jointly with Dr. Larry DeBoer,
which is published in Purdue University’s Rural Indiana Issues Series and reproduced in Appendix C.
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(Gibbs, 2005). Despite the frequently mentioned urban preference of young, well-educated
people (Glaeser,1999; Costa and Kahn, 2000; Florida, 2002), some return to their rural
roots as valuations of locations and their characteristics vary across the life-course (Whisler
et al., 2007). Often, returnees wish to preserve social ties to family and friends but demand
good schools for their offspring (McGranahan et al., 2010). Using education referenda to
make in situ adjustments to the bundle of public goods offered by a community is thus an
important rural development instrument for education researchers and policymakers.
The focus on rural–urban differences in the propensity to resort to educational tax referenda is further motivated by widening disparities following the Great Recession. While the
deteriorating macro-economic conditions decreased the amount of state revenues available
to school districts overall, many rural school districts experienced an additional strain on
their funding, as the property wealth of a community dictates the amount of property taxes
generated for a school district. Rural regions tend to suffer from growing depopulation,
greater poverty and slower economic recovery than their urban counterparts (Parker et al.,
2010). This limits the amount of property tax revenues accrued from their residents and
increases the funding gap between rural and urban school districts. Furthermore, per pupil
costs of rural schools exceed the national average, as they often cannot take advantage
of economies of scale due to their small population bases. Less well-funded rural school
districts must judge whether to keep their schools running or to close, and the threat of
consolidation is a much discussed topic in rural areas.
The literature on referenda proposals in the U.S. is rich (e.g., see Romer et al., 1992;
Muir and Schneider, 1999; Balsdon et al., 2003; Ehrenberg et al., 2004; Holcombe and
Kenny, 2008; Brunner and Ross, 2009) but has, by and large, neglected educational finance
in rural areas.2 This chapter is a response to this neglect and contributes to the literature
by addressing two issues. The first deals with rural–urban differences in school districts
proposing tax referenda to increase school funding. The second issue deals with rural–
urban differences in the voter approval of tax referenda. We are interested in: (1) exploring the existence of such rural–urban differences; (2) identifying the factors that influence
2 Based on a survey by Arnold et al.

(2005), the much analyzed topic that comes closest to educational finance
in rural areas is school consolidation.
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the propensity to propose referenda and subsequent approval probabilities; (3) assessing
whether these factors operate differently in rural than in urban school districts. The chapter
draws on median voter theory to conceptualize and model rural–urban differences in school
districts proposing referenda. In the empirical analysis we use data from school districts in
Illinois, Indiana and Michigan during the period 2010 to 2013.
The results suggest that few school districts take advantage of educational tax referenda, with rural school districts being more likely to do so than urban school districts.
Those that do choose to propose a referendum face a high chance that voters will approve.
Moreover, the results suggest that racial diversity, competition from private schools and
school district size are identified as the salient variables affecting proposal and approval of
referenda, as well as rural–urban variations thereof. Specifically, we find that the likelihood
of referenda proposal tends to decline with racial diversity in both rural and urban school
districts. While rural school districts are more likely to propose referenda in the face of no
private school alternatives, they are less likely when there are several alternatives. Lastly,
while school districts with relatively large enrollments are less likely to propose referenda,
administrations with more personnel are more likely to propose referenda than their counterparts.
The chapter is arranged as follows. Following this introduction, Section 4.2 provides
background on the practice of education referenda in the United States, and Section 4.3
outlines the conceptual framework. The empirical study is presented in Section 4.4, with
sub-sections on the study area, data, model estimation and results. Section 4.5 provides the
conclusions and policy implications.

4.2. Background
Election outcomes are generally explained by median voters or budget-maximizing
agenda setters. Romer and Rosenthal’s (1982) seminal paper examines referenda with restricted agendas for the State of Oregon. The authors test both models and find that agenda
setters, who seek to maximize the expected budget, may succeed in getting residents to vote
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for a higher spending amount than that preferred by the median voter by using a restricted
referendum. Specifically, they find that voters accept a referendum that is 16.5–43.6 percent higher than the budget preferred by the median voter. Similarly, Romer et al. (1992)
find that although school district boards may act as if they represent the interests of the median voter, they are more likely to act as if they are trying to maximize their budgets. Feld
and Grossman (1984) assume voters respond to referenda proposals by way of the median
voter theory and budget-maximizing agenda setters suggest proposals based on voter support by way of the agenda setter theory. They note the cyclical nature of referenda such that
setters propose referenda to voters, voters then vote for or against referenda, giving setters
feedback, which setters then use to determine the maximum proposals the voters will tolerate. The authors find that voter support positively influences subsequently proposed budget
increases but proposed budget increases then lead to reduced voter support.
Balsdon et al. (2003) follow the agenda setter framework and examine the demand for
local school infrastructure investment using a three-equation system for voting outcome,
the decision to propose referenda and the selection of school boards into the referenda
proposal process and of voters into the voting process. They compare budget-maximizing
agenda setters to competitive agenda setters, who set the desired level of spending of the
decisive voter, and find that California school boards act like budget-maximizing agenda
setters by earmarking the maximum property tax increase the decisive (i.e., median) voter
is willing to accept. Holcombe and Kenny (2008) compare restricted choice referenda to
unrestricted choice referenda, in which case residents can select the tax rate, and find that
school spending is higher when choice is limited rather than when voters have unrestricted
choice as in Florida.
Several papers have explicitly examined the validity of the median voter theorem in
their analyses of referenda outcomes. Giles et al. (1976) state the greater ability of persons
with higher economic status to afford taxes as one reason for support for referenda. They
examine people’s willingness to support tax increases for education, hospitals and roads and
find that the respondents are less willing to support the latter. Button (1993) uses median
property value, income and education level as important determinants of voter behavior,
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which he contends is shaped by racial cleavage, in school spending referenda. Button
states that whites have political advantage over blacks due to the greater extent to which
they register and vote. Muir and Schneider (1999) study bond referenda for New York State
from 1978–1990 and find that voters are more likely to support education debt than debt
for other policy needs such as transportation, healthcare, parks and recreation and jails, but
are less likely to support public capital projects of any type. For example, New York State
voters rejected a $2.4 billion school infrastructure bond in 1997. Ehrenberg et al. (2004)
examine the variation in the proportion of successful school district budget proposals over
time and find the length of terms of school board members significantly predicts the passage
of school budget referenda. The authors find that a decrease in income leads to an increase
in the percent voting yes in California school districts. In addition, they state the influence
of the decisive voter’s demand in determining voter rules is smaller in more heterogeneous
communities (see also Romer et al., 1992). We outline the details of the median voter
theorem below, which we use as the basis for our analysis.

4.3. Conceptual Framework
4.3.1. Median Voter Theory
We turn to median voter theory (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957) to shed light on rural–
urban differences in school district decisions to propose referenda and subsequent voter
outcomes. Despite critique and scrutiny (see, e.g., Romer and Rosenthal, 1979), median
voter theory has frequently been used to explain the majority decision-making behavior
of voters (e.g., Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Inman,
1978; Holcombe, 1989; Turnbull and Mitias, 1998; Balsdon et al., 2003, Gerber and Lewis,
2004). The theorem states that the opinion held by the median voter will be the outcome,
given a set of assumptions: (1) It must be assumed that voters’ preferences are singlepeaked; (2) that voters can place election alternatives along a one-dimensional continuum;
and (3) that voters always vote for their true preferences. Despite these strong assumptions,
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Figure 4.1. Formal Representation of the Median Voter of an Education Tax Referendum

the theorem provides a starting point for understanding how voters decide the success or
failure of educational tax referenda.
In the case of educational tax referenda, people vote for or against a referendum based
on the highest utility that they derive from public expenditures on education (via the academic achievement of their own children and/or the overall educational development of
society), given their income constraint. Voters make decisions to accept or reject referenda
proposals after weighing the costs against the benefits associated with better education
(e.g., improved school inputs such as educational expenditures and class size or outputs
such as standardized test scores and graduation rates). Voters also decide the fate of referenda based on their self-interest and perceptions of the benefits of well-funded schools.
Namely, they vote for tax referenda if they believe that well-funded schools can better aid
students and society (Tedin et al., 2001). Zimmer et al. (2011) find that voters who perceive
education as an investment are more likely to support referenda.
Formally, public education expenditures can be placed on a continuum starting at zero,
with a referendum seeking to change the status quo, typically towards spending more on
education, say an increase to “A”. Voters can be placed along the continuum, based upon
their preferences for a particular level of public spending on education. In Figure 4.1,
the voters are assumed to vote “yes” (in favor of the referendum, black boxes) or “no”
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(maintaining the status quo, grey boxes) depending on the closeness of their position to
either of the two options. Voter #5 will cast the decisive vote. Since his/her position is
closer to the proposed spending level “A” than to the status quo, the election outcome will
be an approval of the referendum. Had the proposed expenditure been a little larger, say at
level “B”, then voter #5 would reject the referendum and the referendum would fail.

4.3.2. Identifying the Median Voter
The approval of an educational tax referendum is a function of the distribution of voter
preferences for public spending on education, and the prediction of the outcome of a referendum is equivalent to identifying the median preference for public spending on education.
Based on the relevant literature, we hypothesize that a range of characteristics drive voters’ preferences and thus collectively influence the position of the median voter. Note that
when school district officials choose to propose a tax referendum, the voters’ preference
distribution only plays an indirect role in that school district officials base their choice on
preconceived notions of the determinants that typically influence voter outcomes.
Pivotal among the attributes influencing voters’ preferences are income and educational
attainment. While voters at the extreme ends of the income distribution may have little incentive to support additional spending on public schools (i.e., the very rich may choose
private schools for their children and the poor may favor low taxation in favor of consumption (Corcoran and Evans, 2010)), voters with incomes around the median income may
prefer and benefit most from increased school funding. The higher the median income and
educational attainment of the voting population, the more likely it is that the median voter
values excellence of his/her public schools.
Also of importance, and explored extensively in the literature, is the effect of the racial
composition of the voting population on public spending. For example, Rubinfeld et al.
(1987) find that blacks are more supportive of spending on public education than whites.
However, Button (1993) examine the voting behavior of blacks and whites and conclude
that some of the racial difference can be accounted for by the influence of age on voter
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turnout. Tedin et al. (2001) find that older whites typically vote against, whereas older
voters of other races tend to vote in favor of school bond issues.
Literature specific to the effect of age on referenda outcomes focuses on the elderly.
As they typically have fixed incomes and no school-age children, the expectation is that a
strong presence of older people tends to lower local expenditures on schooling. The empirical evidence is, however, mixed. Some studies find a negative relationship between the
elderly population and acceptance of larger school expenditures. For example, Fletcher
and Kenny (2008) find that the presence of elderly in a community causes a negligible drop
in school spending, Cattaneo and Wolter (2009) conclude that the elderly Swiss are less
willing to spend money on education, and Hilber and Mayer (2002) hypothesize that the
negative relationship between older voters and education expenditures holds for locations
where school spending is not strongly related to housing values. In contrast, for the State
of Florida, Rosenbaum and Button (1989) find that the older population is hardly active
in local politics and thus does not necessarily strengthen an anti-tax mentality. Deller and
Walzer (1993) find that communities with a larger population of retirees are just as likely
to support increased property taxes for education as communities with a smaller presence
of retirees. Finally, Plutzer and Berkman’s (2005) study draws attention to the important
distinction between age and cohort effects. They show that educational spending has increased remarkably and that each new generation is often more supportive of educational
spending than its predecessor.
In addition to the characteristics of the voting population, we also expect attributes of
the school district to influence the propensity to propose referenda, as well as to affect the
probability that referenda will ultimately be approved. School district attributes describe
the context in which referenda are proposed and may influence voters’ preference distribution. For example, Epple and Romano (1996) find the presence of private alternatives
to public services alters the identity of the median voter. Additionally, we expect the size
and administrative organization of the school district to influence referenda proposal and
success. Lastly, the status quo funding level and the proposed tax increase influence the
voting behavior of the median voter. Penska (1996) finds that New York State voters are
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more willing to support small rather than large tax increases. Likewise, Tedin et al. (2001)
find the smaller the proposed increase, the greater the probability of support from residents.

4.3.3. Difference between rural and urban median voters
The propensity of a school district proposing an education tax referendum and the probability of voter approval may be different in rural versus urban school districts because of
three fundamental causes. First, rural–urban differences can be due to compositional disparities with respect to one or more of the attributes influencing the median voter. Indeed,
residents of rural areas have different socioeconomic and demographic characteristics than
their urban counterparts. On average, rural residents have less education and less income.
In particular, rural areas have relatively large amounts of taxable farmland, reducing the
net income of farmland owners and thereby potentially influencing the median of the preference distribution. Moreover, rural areas tend to have a less diverse population and higher
shares of residents aged 65 and older than urban areas. If compositional differences are
the sole contributor to rural–urban differences, then it is sufficient to account for variations
in the median-voter influencing characteristics, when predicting the proposal propensity,
P(Y1 =1), and the passing propensity, P(Y2 =1). Thus, the proper models take on the form:

P(Y1 = 1) = f (X1 , β1 )

(4.1)

P(Y2 = 1) = f (X2 , β2 ),

(4.2)

where X and β are the median voter-influencing attributes and their associated parameters,
respectively.
Second, rurality per se, may be a source of the median-voter difference between rural
and urban areas. That is, characteristics that differentiate urban from rural life (such as high
levels of anonymity, high density and fast pace of daily life) influence the distribution of
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voters along the educational spending continuum. The proper models are thus extended to
include a rurality variable, R:

P(Y1 = 1) = f (γ, β1 , R, X1 )

(4.3)

P(Y2 = 1) = f (γ, β2 , R, X2 )

(4.4)

The parameters γ(Y1 =1) and γ(Y2 =1) indicate by how much the distribution of voters in
rural areas shifts along the spending continuum relative to urban voters.
Third, the difference between rural and urban median voters may be caused by differences in how one or more of the median voter-influencing attributes operate in a rural versus
an urban setting. For example, in a rural setting older people may be more supportive of
education spending than in a more anonymous urban setting. To account for the differential
impact of the median voter influencing attributes, the model needs to be adjusted to:

P(Y1 = 1) = f (γ, R, X1 β1 , RX1 δ )

(4.5)

P(Y2 = 1) = f (γ, R, X2 β2 , RX2 δ ),

(4.6)

where the parameters γ(Y1 =1) and γ(Y2 =1) indicate the effect differences between rural and
urban settings.

4.4. Empirical Analysis
4.4.1. Study Area
A majority of U.S. states require ballot measures to issue new bonds for school districts’ construction projects and capital improvements (Lucy Burns Institute, 2012). Of
those states, 18 require elections to either override the school district budget or exceed the
property tax revenue or levy limit, with some variations of the specific election require-
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ments. For example, eight states do not require elections for school bond and property tax
votes, eleven states have state-protected school debt limits, and three states require annual
voter approval of the school district’s budget. While some states behave quite differently
from one another, several have similar types of ballot measures and elections, making our
conclusions generalizable to many of the contiguous U.S. states.
We focus the empirical analysis on school districts in Illinois, Indiana and Michigan
during the four-year period 2010 to 2013. Combined, these three neighboring states cover
a wide area in the American Midwest, bordered by Kentucky in the South and Canada in
the North. They share several features such as a large supply of agricultural land and dependence on manufacturing. Most important for the questions asked in this study is their
mixture of rural and urban areas. The tri-state region includes the Chicago metropolitan
area with almost ten million people, the Detroit metro area with more than four million
people and the Indianapolis metro area with about two million people. It also includes
numerous small towns and rural counties, many of them having fewer than 10,000 inhabitants.
The three states also represent quite different school finance systems. Table 4.1 summarizes the key characteristics for each state. Illinois has the biggest public school enrollment
with about 2 million students in the 2012–2013 school year, followed by Michigan with
about 1.5 and Indiana with about 1 million students. While their expenditures per student are similar to the national average, the states vary substantially in the sources of their
revenue receipts. While local shares in Illinois shoulder almost two thirds of the revenue
receipts, state funding remains the lowest among the three states. In contrast, state funding
is the dominant source in Michigan (68.3 percent). Indiana takes on a middle position.

2,083,996
1,042,018
1,543,573

27,224,959
11,852,727
15,024,192
Average

Total [$1,000]
13.6
9.2
13
10.1

% Federal
20.5
56.4
68.3
45.8

% State
65.9
34.4
18.7
44.2

% Local

Expenditure per enrolled
student [$]
12,927
11,129
13,686
11,068

Minimum
NJ (3.1 % )
IL (20.5 % )
HI (2.2 % ) AZ ($6,949)
Maximum
OK (19.2 % ) VT (87.6 % )
IL (65.9 %) VT ($19,752)
Source: National Education Association (NEA), 2013
Note: Expenditures per enrolled student, which represent total spending, differ from those shown in Figure 3.2, which examine
current spending. Additionally, these measures are averaged across the entire state, whereas Figure 3.2 represents school districts
averaged across counties.

Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
All
50
States

Enrollment

Revenue Receipts

Table 4.1.: School Finance in the Study Area, 2012–2013
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The three states use local ballot measures to authorize school districts to impose taxes
to fund the operation, improvements, maintenance and/or other expenses of the district.
In Illinois and Michigan, educational referenda practices have a longer tradition than in
Indiana. In fact, historical data on Illinois school district referenda date back to 1972. In
Indiana, school districts have sought additional funding through school referenda primarily
since 2008, prior to which school referenda were rare and used in specific cases for general
fund tax levies.
Additionally, there are some small differences in the educational referenda practices
across the three states. The State of Illinois mandates its school districts to hold elections
to issue bonds for new construction and capital improvements, exceeding the property tax
cap. Michigan requires an election if a school district wants to issue new bonds or exceed
the levy limit or property tax cap set by law. Michigan law restricts the usage of excess
levy limit election proceeds if approved. Indiana used to have a petition-and-remonstrance
process, which only allowed voters to stop funding after a school corporation determined to
begin a school construction project. Indiana altered its school finance approach in 2008 by
eliminating the general fund property tax, capping the remaining school property taxes and
authorizing capital projects referenda. Today, Indiana referenda require voters to approve
a school corporation’s request for additional funds, thus moving funding decisions to the
voting booth (Hiller and Spradlin, 2010).

4.4.2. Data
The tri-state region has 1,675 school districts,3 of which half are located in Illinois, 32
percent in Michigan and 17 percent in Indiana. Of pivotal importance is the distinction
between rural and urban school districts. We classified 764 districts (45.6 percent) as rural
and 911 as urban. The classification is based on the categorization of the National Center
for Education Statistics (NCES) that labels school districts as city, suburb, town or rural
3 We

excluded school districts with fewer than 25 students. On the other extreme, we recognize the largeness
of the public school districts of Chicago and Detroit. We estimated our models without those school districts
and found no qualitative differences in the conclusions of our empirical analysis. This verifies the robustness
of our model estimates.
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area. We collapsed the four-way distinction into two categories whereby city, suburb and
town are collectively defined as urban. To validate our classification, we assigned every
district a score on a continuous rurality scale4 similar to the index of relative rurality, IRR
(Waldorf, 2006). On average, the index of rurality in the school districts classified as rural
is 0.715, compared to only 0.356 in the urban districts.
The data set was compiled using several data sources. First, information on the incidence and success of proposals as well as the proposed tax rate increments was obtained
from two sources. For school districts in Illinois and Michigan, the information was manually transcribed from the online data source Ballotpedia (Lucy Burns Institute, 2013). For
Indiana, the data were provided by Indiana University’s Center for Evaluation and Education Policy.

4 The

scale ranges from zero (most urban) to one (most rural), and school districts are placed along the scale
based on composite of population size (log), population density, and the percent of the population classified
as urban according to the US Census.
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Table 4.2.: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
propose

Data Source
NCES

pass
rural

NCES

IRR
nonwhite
pop65+
college
income
enroll
admin
revenue

derived with ACS
data
ACS

NCES

private
tax

Ballotpedia

yr

Ballotpedia

state

Definitions
1 if school district ever proposed a referendum
during 2010–2013, 0 otherwise
1 if at least one proposal passed, 0 otherwise
1 if classified as “rural area” by NCES, 0 otherwise
index of relative rurality
percent population that is nonwhite
percent population that is 65 or older
percent population with at least a bachelor’s degree
median family income in 2011 ($1,000)
daily student enrollment (1,000s)
number of school district administrators
total elementary-secondary school revenue per
pupil ($1,000)
number of private school alternatives in school
district
property tax increase proposed by referendum
(minimum increase proposed if more than one
referendum) (percentage points)
years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 during which
a school district proposed a referendum
Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan

Second, demographic and socio-economic information about the population residing
in the school districts are taken from the American Community Survey (ACS). Given the
small spatial scale of school districts, the Census Bureau does not release single-year estimates. Instead, we used the 5-year estimates referring to the years 2007 to 2012. Finally,
school district characteristics like per pupil expenditures, enrollment, administrators and
private school alternatives are provided by the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES). Sources and definitions of all variables used in the analyses are listed in Table 4.2.
Table 4.3 provides summary statistics for all 1,675 school districts as well as summary
statistics calculated separately for urban and rural school districts. The variables of interest
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are school districts’ propensity to propose a referendum and the probability that a school
district votes in favor of a referendum. The operationalization of both variables takes into
account the small number of school districts that proposed more than one referendum during the four-year period.5 First, we define the dummy variable propose as one for school
districts that ever proposed a referendum during the four-year period, and zero otherwise.
Overall, 345 or 20.6 percent of the 1,675 school districts ever proposed a referendum.
Moreover, the propensity to propose a referendum was 23.4 percent higher in rural districts
than in urban districts, of which only 18.2 percent ever proposed a referendum. Second, the
referendum pass rate of a school district is only observed for those school districts that ever
proposed a referendum (Table 4.4). Thus, the dummy variable pass is assigned the value
one if the school district successfully passed at least one proposal, conditional upon ever
proposing a referendum. Of the 345 school districts that ever proposed a referendum, 286
or 82.9 percent had at least one proposal successfully approved by voters. Pass rates were
slightly higher in rural than in urban school districts, but the difference is not statistically
significant.

5 Note

that 92, or 5 percent of the 1,675 school districts, proposed more than one referendum during the
four-year study period. The vast majority, 79, of those school districts are located in Michigan.

All
Mean
Std.Dev.
propose
0.206
0.405
rural
0.456
0.498
IRR
0.519
0.228
nonwhite
11.373
15.943
pop65+
14.930
4.448
college
21.473
13.272
income
54.367
18.581
enroll
2.699
10.611
admin
3.647
9.337
revenue
11.861
3.224
private
1.541
2.249
IN
0.170
0.376
IL
0.510
0.500
MI
0.319
0.466
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
0.715
7.196
15.510
18.891
53.295
1.059
2.015
11.259
0.653
0.185
0.448
0.368

0.135
11.009
4.945
10.648
16.608
1.264
1.533
2.844
1.635
0.388
0.498
0.483

Rural
Mean
Std.Dev.
0.234
0.424
0.356
14.875
14.443
23.638
55.266
4.074
5.015
12.366
2.285
0.158
0.563
0.279

0.147
18.413
3.921
14.788
20.051
14.200
12.422
3.432
2.418
0.365
0.496
0.449

Urban
Mean
Std.Dev.
0.182
0.386

Table 4.3.: Summary Statistics: All School Districts in IL, IN, and MI

0.359∗∗∗
−7.679∗∗∗
1.066∗∗∗
−4.747∗∗∗
−1.971∗∗
−3.016∗∗∗
−3.000∗∗∗
−1.107∗∗∗
−1.632∗∗∗
0.026
−0.115∗∗∗
0.089∗∗∗

0.052∗∗∗

R-U
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All
Mean
Std.Dev.
pass
0.829
0.377
rural
0.519
0.500
IRR
0.544
0.214
nonwhite
8.721
11.151
pop65+
14.875
4.649
college
21.529
12.658
income
51.667
14.413
enroll
2.646
3.357
revenue
11.155
2.878
private
1.284
1.848
tax
0.916
0.828
yr 2010
0.235
0.424
yr 2011
0.267
0.443
yr 2012
0.342
0.475
yr 2013
0.157
0.364
IL
0.081
0.273
IN
0.133
0.340
MI
0.786
0.411
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
0.703
5.785
15.801
18.173
49.949
1.229
10.960
0.497
1.039
0.201
0.235
0.385
0.179
0.050
0.101
0.849

0.126
6.279
5.319
8.541
10.963
1.039
3.371
0.932
0.838
0.402
0.425
0.488
0.384
0.219
0.302
0.359

Rural
Mean
Std.Dev.
0.844
0.364
0.372
11.886
13.877
25.148
53.519
4.174
11.367
2.133
0.783
0.271
0.301
0.295
0.133
0.114
0.169
0.717

0.145
14.046
3.55
15.164
17.229
4.220
2.219
2.187
0.799
0.446
0.461
0.458
0.340
0.319
0.376
0.452

Urban
Mean
Std.Dev.
0.813
0.391

Table 4.4.: Summary Statistics: School Districts That Ever Proposed a Referendum

0.331∗∗∗
−6.101∗∗∗
1.924∗∗∗
−6.975∗∗∗
−3.570∗∗
−2.945∗∗∗
−0.407
−1.636∗∗∗
0.256∗∗∗
−0.070
−0.066
0.090∗
0.046
−0.064∗∗
−0.068∗
0.132∗∗∗

0.031

R-U
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The first group of explanatory variables comprises variables hypothesized to influence
the median voter and includes demographic and economic population characteristics. Foremost, the race and age compositions of the population are captured through the percentage
of nonwhite population and the percentage of persons aged 65 or above. On average, the
share of the nonwhite population in rural school districts is substantially smaller than in urban school districts, while the share of elderly is slightly, albeit still significantly larger.
This is also the case among the select sample of school districts that ever proposed a
referendum but at a lower level, as the representation of the nonwhite population in the
referenda-proposing districts is quite low. Median income and the percent of the population with a Bachelors’ degree or higher are also hypothesized to influence the position
of the median voter. On average, the population of urban school districts is better educated and has substantially higher median income than the population in the rural districts.
Moreover, the rural–urban differences for these two variables are substantially larger in the
select sample of referenda-proposing school districts than in the full set of school districts
(differences of $3,564 versus the overall $1,971 for median income and 6.98 percentage
points versus the overall 4.75 percentage point difference in the college-educated population share).
The second group of variables comprises school district attributes, accounting for variations in the context in which a referendum is proposed and ultimately passed or rejected.
Table 4.3 documents the substantial and statistically significant rural–urban differences in
these variables. On average, rural school districts have fewer students (enroll), receive
less revenue per student (revenue) and face less competition from private schools (private).
Whereas the rural–urban differences of the population characteristics were amplified in the
select set of referenda-proposing school districts, the opposite is the case for these three
school district attributes. The variable admin measures the number of administrators in
the school district and is only of relevance in the context of proposing a referendum. On
average, urban school districts have about five administrators, compared to only two in the
average rural district. The variable tax is the minimum tax increase proposed by the ref-
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erendum and only plays a role for variations in the pass rate. The minimum tax increase
proposed is significantly higher in rural districts than in urban districts.
Finally, the empirical model also includes fixed effects distinguishing among the three
states and among the four study years. The state fixed effects account for school finance and
regulatory differences across states. The year fixed effects capture, for example, the gradual
improvement in prevailing macro-economic conditions during the four-year period. De
Neve (2011) argued that during weak economic conditions and as income growth contracts,
the median voter will view taxation as more burdensome and will likely vote against higher
taxes and public spending. As a result, school districts will prefer proposing referenda
during periods of income growth and refrain from doing so during periods of economic
instability or decline.

4.4.3. Model Estimation
Voter approval of a referendum is conditional upon the referendum being proposed.
Thus, the models of school districts proposing and passing referenda outlined in section 3.3
are estimated jointly as a two-stage sample selection model (Heckman, 1979). Although
several studies have examined educational tax referenda outcomes, many have neglected
the incidence of sample selection bias (see e.g., Stevens and Mason, 1996; Lentz, 1999;
Muir and Schneider, 1999; Balsdon et al., 2003; Ehrenberg et al., 2003; Holcombe and
Kenny, 2008; Cattaneo and Wolter, 2009). For example, Ehrenberg et al. (2004) recognize
the non-random nature of school district decisions to propose referenda but do not account
for selection bias due to a lack of variables “that might be expected to influence whether a
district appears in our sample but that do not influence the voting outcomes given that the
district appears” (p. 15). If the subsample of school districts that have proposed referenda
have similar characteristics as those that have not, there is no reason to suspect selectivity
bias among the subsample. However, it is difficult to refute the existence of selection bias,
as school districts propose referenda only if they think they can pass or when their facilities
require attention. As a result, referenda outcomes are essentially “missing” when school
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districts do not propose referenda. Heckman’s (1979) two-stage sample selection method
corrects for non-randomly selected samples under the assumption of joint normality of the
error terms.
Both the first stage of proposing a referendum and the second stage of passing a referendum are specified as probit models, suggested by Heckman as an alternative to his
original first-stage probit and second-stage OLS specification. Previous research has used
the double probit or bivariate probit specification (e.g., Neal, 1995; Afxentiou and Hawley, 1997; Monfardini and Radice, 2008; Holm and Jaeger, 2011). The model is estimated
using STATA’s heckprobit command, with standard errors clustered over states. The linear predictors of the two stages are identical, except for the variables admin (only enters
the predictor of the referenda proposing equation), and the variable tax (only serves as a
predictor variable in the second stage of predicting the passing of a referendum). There
are often few candidates for exclusion from one equation of Heckman’s two-stage model
and inclusion in the other (Vella, 1998). The exclusion of a variable from either equation highlights the importance of treating the referendum proposal decision differently than
the referendum outcome. By excluding the variable admin from the second equation, we
ensure proper identification of the model, avoiding multicollinearity issues resulting from
estimating identical selection and outcome predictors.
Often, the greater is the number of administrators per district, the larger is the organization. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, administrators include
superintendents, deputy and assistant superintendents, and other persons with district-wide
responsibilities such as business managers and administrative assistants. Note that, on
average, the number of administrators is greater in urban than in rural areas. Larger organizations often have a different financial agenda than smaller organizations. Larger organizations may be more strategic in proposing referenda than smaller organizations. Hentschke
et al. (2009) find the leadership behaviors of school superintendents of relatively small urban school districts tend to differ noticeably from those of very large urban school districts.
They note that differences between small and large urban school districts may have less to
do with the so-called expertise of superintendents and more to do with organizational issues
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of span of control and diseconomics of scale associated with the costs of control. This has
implications for the role of the superintendent in small versus large school districts. For
example, Hentschke et al. suggest that superintendents of relatively smaller districts tend
to exhibit more hands-on instructional leadership than superintendents of large districts.
This also suggests that superintendents of large districts may delegate more of their duties
to other staff.
As Meltzer and Richard (1981) state, relevant literature on the size or growth of government emphasizes the incentives for bureaucrats to increase their incomes and power by
increasing spending and the control of resources. A bureacrat is a member of an organization’s administration. Although the term bureaucrat often refers to someone within an
institution of government, school district administrators may certainly fit the definition.
Accordingly, one may consider a school district’s decision to propose a referendum to be
the result of an administrator’s ultimate desire for power. This may be especially true
for larger organizations with relatively more administrators, as they may aim to infuence
smaller organizations with their fiscal decisions. If larger organizations propose referenda
and succeed, smaller organizations may choose to subsequently propose referenda or ultimately be forced to consolidate at the extreme. Of course, while the literature largely
outlines bureacrats’ desire for power, one may also interpret school districts’ financial decisions as those made to promote their true belief in student success.
We additionally examine agency type as an exclusion restriction.6 The NCES defines it
according to a school district’s level of administrative and operational control. The classifications are: regular local school district not part of supervisory union; local school district
part of supervisory union; supervisory union administrative center or county superintendent’s office; regional educational services agency; state agency charged with providing
elementary and/or secondary level instruction; federal agency charged with providing instruction; charter school agencies; and other agencies. One would expect a school district
that is part of a supervisory union to have a different financial agenda than one that is not.
Depending on the financial strength of an administration, a school district that is part of
6 We

estimated our models with agency type as the exclusion restriction and found no qualitative differences
in the conclusions of our empirical analysis.
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a supervisory union may choose to forgo the proposal of a referendum and its associated
election costs if it instead needs to focus on its operational budget. A school district that
is not part of a supervisory union may have more financial flexibility and freedom to incur
election-related expenditures. Additionally, state and federal education agencies often have
different financial agendas. Lastly, while we are currently unaware of any Indiana, Illinois
or Michigan charter schools that have proposed referenda for additional funds, this may
change as more charter schools continue to burgeon across the nation.
Balsdon et al. (2003) further examine two exclusion restrictions that enter the selection
but not the outcome equation. One is election costs, which pertain to those costs associated
with an election such as the hiring of campaign consultants and purchase of advertising
time. The second is flotation costs, which refer to costs associated with professional financial advice and the underwriting of bonds, bond rating and filing and court fees. Bonds are
often used to finance school infrastructure investment if voters in fact accept a school district’s referenda proposal to increase property taxes until the bonds are fully repaid. Either
variable would be an effective exclusion restriction, as voters do not consider either cost
when making their decisions to accept or reject a referendum. Unfortunately, we do not
have either type of data and therefore cannot utilize those variables.
While we consider agency type, election costs and flotation costs, we believe the number of administrators provides a good exclusion restriction given data limitations. We have
an inherent interest in the first stage of the Heckman model, especially in terms of potential
differences between urban and rural areas, and thus, the two-stage setup goes beyond the
statistical correction for possible sample selection.

4.4.4. Results
Table 4.5 displays the estimation results. Model 1 shows the base model that accounts
for compositional differences as the source for possible differences between rural and urban
school districts. Model 2 accounts for the rurality effect using the dummy variable rural.
Model 3 is the most comprehensive model that allows for rural–urban differences in the
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effects of all salient covariates. The estimation results suggest that sample selection bias is
not a severe issue. In fact, for Models 1 and 2, the parameter ρ is not significantly different
from zero, and for Model 3, the p-value is slightly above 10 percent.
Estimation results that use the index of relative rurality (IRR) are tabulated in Appendix
B. The results for Model 2 by and large confirm the above-mentioned results (Model 1
results are the same since it excludes rurality). Regardless of whether rurality is measured
on a binary or continuous scale (ranging from 0 to 1), it has no statistically significant
impact on school district decisions to propose referenda or voter outcomes, as confirmed
by Model 2. While the estimation results for Model 3 indicate the statistically significant
impact of rurality on demographic, socioeconomic and school district characteristics, the
parameter ρ is highly statistically insignificant. Therefore, we discuss the results presented
in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5.: Estimation Results
Model 1

Model 2

b (SEb )

b (SEb )

Model 3
Rural
b (SEb )

Urban
b (SEb )

R-U

Propose
intercept

0.306
(0.195)

rural
nonwhite
pop65+
income
college
private
enroll
revenue
admin
IN
IL

−0.012∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.029∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.011∗∗
(0.005)
0.013
(0.022)
−0.019
(0.052)
0.020∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.006
(0.025)
−1.101∗∗∗
(0.070)
−1.944∗∗∗
(0.034)

0.293
(0.217)
0.025
(0.097)
−0.012∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.030∗∗∗
(0.0005)
−0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.011∗∗
(0.005)
0.014
(0.018)
−0.018
(0.050)
0.020∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.006
(0.024)
−1.101∗∗∗
(0.068)
−1.941∗∗∗
(0.035)

−0.518
(0.481)

−0.021∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.034∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.001)
0.009
(0.011)
−0.092∗∗
(0.044)
−0.051∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.046∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.134∗∗∗
(0.025)
−1.437∗∗∗
(0.016)
−2.028∗∗∗
(0.054)

0.521
(0.407)

−0.010∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.037∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.003
(0.002)
0.011∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.053 ∗ ∗
(0.022)
−0.023
(0.049)
−0.007
(0.006)
0.005
(0.028)
−0.784∗∗∗
(0.116)
−1.784∗∗∗
(0.057)

−1.039

−0.0116∗∗∗
0.003
0.002
−0.002
−0.145∗∗∗
−0.028
0.053∗∗∗
0.129∗∗
−0.653∗∗∗
−0.244∗∗∗

Pass
intercept

0.488
(0.938)

rural
nonwhite
pop65+
income

0.010
(0.011)
0.026
(0.022)
0.003
(0.021)

0.307
0.233
(1.340)
(1.099)
0.106
(0.115)
0.010
−0.032∗
(0.011)
(0.019)
0.025
0.005
(0.022)
(0.048)
0.002
−0.026
(0.021)
(0.033)
Table 4.5 – continued

0.785
(1.365)

0.011
(0.013)
0.007
(0.009)
−0.002
(0.016)

−0.552

−0.043∗∗∗
−0.002
−0.024
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Model 1

Table 4.5 – Continued from previous page
Model 2
Model 3

Rural
Urban
b (SEb )
b (SEb )
b (SEb )
b (SEb )
college
0.019
0.020
0.160∗∗∗
0.012
(0.020)
(0.021)
(0.038)
(0.025)
private
0.074∗∗∗
0.083∗∗∗
0.274∗∗∗
0.019
(0.018)
(0.016)
(0.063)
(0.050)
revenue
−0.017
−0.017
−0.035
0.002
(0.020)
(0.022)
(0.052)
(0.045)
∗∗∗
enroll
0.013
0.016
−0.591
0.049∗
(0.016)
(0.019)
(0.157)
(0.028)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
tax
0.440
0.446
0.770
0.331∗∗∗
(0.106)
(0.109)
(0.223)
(0.101)
yr2010
0.050
0.162
−0.003
0.291
(0.350)
(0.626)
(0.511)
(0.758)
yr2011
0.091
0.199
0.303
0.400
(0.354)
(0.414)
(0.477)
(0.503)
yr2013
−0.107
0.095
0.107
−0.192
(0.507)
(0.504)
(0.559)
(0.596)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗
IN
−1.295
−1.339
−1.231
−1.360∗∗
(0.405)
(0.405)
(0.561)
(0.567)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗
IL
−1.812
−1.866
−2.800
−1.462∗∗
(0.629)
(0.611)
(1.217)
(0.635)
bρ
−0.275
−0.232
−0.340
(0.226)
(0.268)
(0.212)
ρ
−0.268
−0.228
−0.32∗
(0.210)
(0.254)
(0.189)
2
2
Wald test χ (1)=1.46 χ (1)=0.75 χ 2 (1)=2.57
p> χ 2 =0.23 p> χ 2 =0.39 p> χ 2 =0.11
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.

R-U
0.148∗∗
0.255∗∗∗
−0.037
−0.640∗∗∗
0.439∗∗∗
−0.294
−0.097
0.299∗∗∗
0.129∗∗∗
−1.338∗∗

4.4.4.1. Proposing a Referendum
Turning first to the probability that a school district proposes a referendum (upper panel
of Table 4.5), the estimation results suggest that it is not sufficient to account for an overall rurality effect–the dummy variable rural is not statistically significant–but that, instead,
rural–urban differences in the likelihood to propose referenda are manifested in effect dif-
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ferences of several explanatory variables. The interpretations below are thus based on
Model 3.
Racial diversity, measured by the variable nonwhite, enters the model with rural and
urban coefficients that are significantly different from zero and significantly different from
each other. The differential effects of racial diversity in rural and urban school districts on
the likelihood of proposing an education tax referendum are visualized in Figure 4.2.7 For
all-white school districts, the probability is estimated to be 25.9 percent in rural districts
and 21.7 percent in urban districts. With increasing racial diversity, the probabilities decline
in both rural and urban districts. However, the decline is steeper in urban areas than in rural
areas and ultimately, the proposal probability is higher in urban than in rural districts. In
the extreme (all-nonwhite district), the proposal probabilities are 6.3 percent in urban and
only 2.1 percent in rural districts.

Figure 4.2. The Effect of Racial Diversity on Estimated Referendum Proposal Probabilities for Rural and Urban School Districts
7 The

displayed estimated probabilities in Figures 4.2 to 4.7 refer to average marginal effects.
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The share of elderly in a school district’s population has the anticipated negative impact
on the proposal probabilities (Figure 4.3). The effect is substantial, but there is no significant difference between the impact in rural versus urban areas. In demographically young
districts (elderly share around 5 percent), the estimated probabilities are between 32.4 and
32.6 percent; in districts with an aging population (elderly share above 25 percent), the
proposal probabilities dropped below 14 percent.

Figure 4.3. The Effect of Elderly Share on Estimated Referendum Proposal Probabilities for Rural and Urban School Districts

Surprisingly, median income does not have a significant impact on proposal probabilities. Educational attainment (college) has a positive effect on proposal probabilities but
is significant only in urban areas (Figure 4.4). In Michigan’s urban school districts with a
poorly educated population, say fewer than 5 percent graduated from college, the proposal
probability is estimated to be 3 percent lower than in rural districts with a well-educated
population, say around 70 percent as is found for example in college towns like East Lansing and Ann Arbor.
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Figure 4.4. The Effect Educational Attainment on Estimated Referendum
Proposal Probabilities for Rural and Urban School Districts

Moving on to the influence of school district variables on the proposal probabilities
(Figures 4.5a and 4.5b), the presence of private schools (Figure 4.5a) turns out to contribute most distinctly to rural–urban differences. There is no private school alternative
available (private = 0) in almost half (46 percent) of the school districts. For that case, the
proposal probability is estimated to be significantly higher in rural than in urban districts,
24.4 percent versus 18.1 percent. As the number of private school alternatives increases,
rural districts respond with fewer proposals for educational tax referenda, whereas proposing such referenda is estimated to become a more sought-after strategy in urban school
districts. For example, when facing competition from five private school alternatives, the
proposal probability increased to 23.7 percent in urban districts whereas it decreased to
16.3 percent in the rural counterparts.
The coefficients of all other school district variables are significantly different from zero
only for rural school districts. As shown in Figure 4.5a, the effect of school district size
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is negative, whereas the effects of per pupil revenue and administration size are positive
(Figure 4.5b).

Figure 4.5a. The Effect of Private School Alternatives (top), School District Size (bottom)
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Figure 4.5b. Per Pupil Revenue (top) and Number of Administrators (bottom) on Estimated Referendum Proposal Probabilities for Rural and Urban
School Districts

4.4.4.2. Voter Approval of Proposed Referendum
Conditional upon proposing an educational tax referendum, voters in the school district
can approve or reject the referendum. While variables describing the population compo-

94
sition were found to have a significant effect on proposal probabilities, their influence is
minor when it comes to predicting referendum approval. In fact, none of the population
composition variables is significant for urban districts, and only racial diversity and educational attainment of the population have significant coefficients for rural districts. The
estimated referendum approval probabilities in response to these latter two variables are
displayed in Figure 4.6.
Racial diversity has a weak significantly negative effect on the pass rate in rural districts, and the approval probability declines from about 43.8 percent in all-white districts
to 7.7 percent in all-nonwhite districts. An even more drastic response can be expected
when changing the share of college graduates. The approval probability is estimated to be
less than 6 percent in rural districts with very few college graduates, whereas approval is
almost certain when the share of college graduates exceed the average. In urban school districts, the approval probability is estimated to be 36.7 percent in districts with few college
graduates and 76.8 percent in districts with many.
Three of the school district variables are estimated to have significant parameters. First,
the presence of private alternatives has a highly significant positive coefficient for rural
school districts only. For rural districts with all other variables fixed at average values, the
approval probability increases from 34.5 percent to 51.9 percent as the number of private
schools is raised from 0 to 5 (Figure 4.7).
Second, the influence of school district size on the approval probability is more interesting, as rural and urban districts have different responses. Increasing school district size
weakly increases the likelihood of educational referenda approval in urban districts but
lowers the chance of approval in rural districts. Finally, a positive effect is estimated for
the proposed tax increase. This may seem counterintuitive. However, the tax variable represents the minimum tax increase (per $100 assessed value) proposed by a school district.
According to the data, approximately 73 percent of the school districts that proposed at
least one referendum passed the referendum with greater than 50 percent pass rate at an average tax rate of 1.07 per $100 assessed value. This tax rate corresponds only with Illinois
and Michigan school districts, as the average proposed tax rate across Indiana school dis-
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Figure 4.6. The Effect of Racial Diversity (top) and Educational Attainment (bottom) on Estimated Referendum Approval Probabilities for Rural
and Urban School Districts
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Figure 4.7. The Effect of Private School Alternatives (top), School District
Size (middle) and Tax Rate (bottom) on Estimated Referendum Approval
Probabilities for Rural and Urban School Districts
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tricts is only 0.28. Therefore, the positive sign on the tax variable may be interpreted more
along the lines of differences among the states’ institutional practices and corresponding
referenda mechanisms and less as a deviation from typical voter behavior. Lastly, although
highly significant, the magnitude of the effect and the effect difference between rural and
urban school districts are small.

4.5. Summary and Conclusions
School districts propose education tax referenda to attain funds in addition to their
state-allocated funds and federal funding. This research set out to analyze rural–urban
differences in (1) the propensity that school districts propose such referenda and (2) the
likelihood that voters approve the referendum. Rooted in median voter theory, we conceptualized that referendum proposal probabilities and referendum approval probabilities
differ between rural and urban school districts and are influenced by voter composition and
school district attributes. For the empirical analysis, we used a sample of school districts
from Illinois, Indiana and Michigan during the four-year period 2010 to 2013.
We found that, during the four-year period, only one out of five school districts resorted
to a tax referendum strategy to attain additional funds, but that rural school districts were
significantly more likely to do so than urban school districts. Once a referendum is proposed, voters are very likely to approve the proposed tax increase. In fact, in more than
80 percent of all school districts that had proposed a referendum, voters were supportive of
the proposed increase. Moreover, voter approval of an educational referendum was slightly,
but not significantly, more likely in rural than in urban school districts.
Accounting for sample selectivity and jointly estimating probit models of the proposal
and approval probabilities, our research identified the factors influencing the probabilities
and assessed whether these factors operate differently in rural than in urban school districts.
The main results can be summarized in three points. First, we found that voter composition plays a pivotal role for the chances that an educational tax referendum is proposed
and that it is approved. Most important is the racial composition. Ceteris paribus, white
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school districts are significantly more likely to propose an educational tax referendum than
racially diverse school districts. And the race gradient is steeper in rural than in urban
school districts. Regarding the chances that voters approve an educational tax referendum,
urban districts’ approval probabilities do not vary by race, whereas rural districts’ approvals
become significantly less likely as racial diversity intensifies.
Second, among the school district attributes, competition from private school alternatives is particularly important for the likelihood of a referendum being proposed. Moreover,
rural and urban school districts differ in their response. Stronger competition makes urban
districts more prone to seek additional funds whereas rural districts become less likely to
propose a tax referendum. Rural districts’ reduced propensity to propose a referendum with
increasing competition is interesting, since rural voters become more likely to approve an
additional tax as the competition becomes stronger. Finally, the controversy around school
district consolidation in rural areas seems to be reflected in the effect of school district size
on voter approval for higher taxes. Voters of small rural school districts are more likely to
approve tax increases than voters in larger rural districts.
We take Ehrenberg et al.’s (2003) discussion on the timing of proposed budgets as the
starting point for our discussion. The authors state that people who turn out to vote for
referenda proposals that are timed conjointly with general elections may not necessarily
value public education as highly as people who turn out specifically for referenda elections. Therefore, they recommend that school boards aiming to maximize their budgets
hold elections separately from general elections. However, school boards aiming to accurately represent the preferences of their district voters should hold their elections simultaneously with general elections. The question then becomes, what are the preferences of the
voters?
According to our results, urban and rural school districts with all-white populations
are more likely to propose referenda than those with increasing levels of racial diversity.
Consequently, rural nonwhite residents are less likely to approve referenda, supporting
school boards’ decisions to propose fewer referenda in racially diverse districts. However,
urban nonwhite residents have no effect on referenda pass rates. Perhaps school boards may
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benefit from proposing more referenda in those districts. Our results indicate that urban
school districts with all-nonwhite districts are 6.3 percent more likely to propose referenda,
although that probability may be increased based on the knowledge that nonwhite residents
do not statistically significantly reject referenda.
The results indicate that all school officials are wary of proposing referenda to elderly
populations. However, the population aged 65 and over does not significantly affect referenda success. Furthermore, some previous research has found positive elderly support
for educational spending, as stated previously. Regardless of whether the effect is positive
or insignificant (as we found), school districts with elderly populations are less likely to
propose referenda, signifying the mismatch between voter preferences and school board
preferences.
Private schools provide alternatives to public education and thereby influence school
district decisions to propose referenda, as evidenced by the results. While rural school districts are less likely to propose referenda, urban school districts are more likely. However,
these results do not concur with the pass equation results, as rural residents with private
school alternatives are more likely to pass referenda. Urban residents are not influenced by
private schools. This could mean that urban school districts have more confidence in voter
support despite alternative schooling than rural school districts. However, it could also
mean that rural school districts do not adequately understand their residents’ preferences.
If rural school districts propose fewer referenda than they could potentially gain support
for, they may face larger financial struggles than their urban counterparts over time. This
will likely lead to further consolidation of rural school districts.
When the decision to propose referenda is made, school superintendents should recognize the major stakeholders of the local school community and help them understand the
aspects of why more funding is necessary. It may be that many stakeholders are unaware of
the capital project or general need for additional funds and/or are not given enough time to
understand why it would be good for their community and children. Therefore, they may
not be willing to support a referendum. Hutton (2009) states that the school administration
and board of education need to be very clear regarding the project costs and total impact of
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the tax increase on property owners in the school community. School officials must follow
appropriate strategies to inform voters of their needs.
The use of school-district data is not without difficulties. One can argue that states share
borders, and so their nearby school districts may be correlated. One expects spatial interactions to exist among their local governments of contiguous states. Local governments
influence one another in their public spending decisions such that one local government
has a spillover effect on its neighbor. They often finance educational spending through
property taxes and therefore care how their tax rates and local public expenditures compare
to neighboring jurisdictions. Future work aims to test for spatial dependence and heterogeneity across school districts of neighboring states.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

This dissertation analyzes the ways in which people seek the benefits of education.
While this has been done before, we focus on three points that have either been neglected
by or not been made entirely clear by the relevant literature. People seeking the benefits
of education may choose to either move to another locality in search of better education or
remain in their locality and improve their current level of schooling. Housing prices and
migration rates have been used by researchers, both directly and indirectly, to review and
examine the movement of individuals in search of better education. On the other hand,
tax referenda proposals and subsequent pass rates reveal the preferences for higher quality
education of those who remain.

5.1. Summary of Findings
We examine three research problems related to U.S. school quality. The first relates
to inconclusive results on the effects of various types of school quality on housing prices;
the second analyzes whether educational expenditures, in particular, affect location choice;
and the third studies the determinants of educational tax referenda proposals and subsequent pass rates. We use econometric methods focused on identifying causal relationships,
including propensity score matching and Heckman sample selection models, as well as
meta-regression analysis to summarize the existing literature. The following paragraphs
integrate the empirical findings to answer the dissertation’s three research questions and
provide concluding remarks.
We use meta-regression analysis to answer the first research problem. Meta-regression
analysis provides a way to summarize results from disparate studies of the same topic,
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which are prevalent across the school quality literature. This method allows us to effectively
answer the research question of why previous research has failed to converge on the sign
and magnitude of the effect of school quality on housing prices. We pose several hypotheses
as to what factors have driven this divergence. One is that various measures of school
quality have been employed across the school quality literature. Previous researchers have
examined the effects of school outputs, inputs and/or peer effects. Naturally, this should
drive the imbalances across study results, as test scores may not convey the same type of
effect on housing prices as educational expenditures or school size. Another hypothesis
refers to the use of different estimators, which have generally depended on assumptions of
endogeneity across the literature. One would expect that studies accounting for endogeneity
would obtain smaller estimates than otherwise. Additionally, functional form should drive
discrepancies among the study results, as the proposed relationship between school quality
and housing prices may not be the same across studies.
To test our hypotheses and answer the research question, we examine 48 North American and European studies. Generally, we find that all school outputs, inputs and peer effects
get capitalized into housing prices to some extent. Specifically, we find that studies which
measure school quality with outputs tend to find a 0.15 correlation with housing prices.
The correlation declines to 0.14 with peer effects and to 0.13 with educational expenditures. However, studies which measure school quality with more than one type including
peer effects tend to find a 0.01 lower correlation with housing prices. Our results differ
from previous studies that have found either no significant impact of a measure of school
quality on housing prices or some significant impact of either school outputs, school inputs
or peer effects on housing prices (but generally not all simultaneously). As we hypothesized, different measures of school quality, estimators and functional form drive much of
the differences between individual studies and the meta–regression analysis. Additionally,
publication bias is very much apparent across the relevant literature, as it happens to drive
differences in the magnitude and significance of estimates across published and unpublished studies, the former of which tend to find a higher correlation between school quality
and housing prices. Surprisingly, the use of quasi-experimental methods, which allow re-
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searchers to estimate a causal impact without random assignment to a treatment or control
group, was not found to statistically significantly impact the correlation.
The meta–regression analysis allows for an overall understanding of the indirect effect of school quality on migration through housing prices. As our results suggest that
studies which measure school quality with educational expenditures tend to find a positive correlation with housing prices, we narrow the focus of school quality to educational
expenditures. We also narrow the spatial unit to U.S. counties to answer the second research question of whether school spending affects location choice. Here, we examine
migration directly rather than indirectly through housing prices. Based on the relevant literature, school spending should positively and statistically significantly affect inmigration,
as high expenditures provide implications for the quality of schools. School resources,
along with parental inputs or family influences and peers, have been found to positively
affect student achievement. However, we face the problem of endogeneity between educational expenditures and inmigration, as wealthy individuals tend to sort themselves into
wealthy neighborhoods. Thereby, they support their local schools through high property
taxes which then get used for school spending.
Using generalized propensity score methods to tackle this problem, we find specific
thresholds up to which educational expenditures positively affect inmigration. The results
reveal that while inmigration rises with expenditures of up to about $7,000, inmigration
generally remains flat beyond that. This suggests that a high level of expenditures beyond
$7,000 does not necessarily cause more people to migrate to a locality. While advancements to education are aimed at bolstering job opportunities and overall economic capacity,
the extent to which people migrate to a region due to high educational expenditures remains
flat as expenditures rise above $7,000.
In the final dissertation essay, we explore the determinants of educational tax referenda proposals and pass rates. We narrow the study region to U.S. school districts for the
States of Indiana, Illinois and Michigan and give specific focus to rural areas. A limitation
of the relevant school quality literature pertains to the dearth of rural educational finance
studies. There exists a general neglect toward analyses of rural education development.
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Current depopulation trends of rural areas heighten the importance of conducting analyses
of public education that relate to topics other than the generally considered rural school
consolidation.
Current depopulation trends in many rural areas, broadly speaking, underscore the uncertainty of the fate of economic growth. As school quality is a primary driver of economic
growth, many school districts strive to improve their quality and student resources. With
reduced state funding especially after the Great Recession, school districts have exploited
additional sources of revenue, one of which is through referenda. Nevertheless, few school
districts have taken advantage of the tax referenda mechanism. We test the hypotheses that
voters may be wary of the cost of the proposed property tax increase and/or may not readily perceive the need for additional school funding, thereby influencing school officials’
decisions to propose referenda. Additionally, we hypothesize that demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of school districts, which differ widely across rural and urban
school districts, to influence their decisions to propose referenda and voters’ decisions to
pass them.
The study sample shows that rural school districts have proposed more referenda than
urban school districts. While this trend does not necessarily reflect the entire United States,
the proclivity of rural school districts to propose referenda across the sample reflects the
generally deteriorating conditions of rural areas. Rural schools have suffered setbacks to
school funding over the past several years. Per pupil costs of rural schools exceed the
national average, as they often cannot take advantage of economies of scale due to their
small populations. Furthermore, rural schools face challenges with respect to other school
inputs and outputs, which undoubtedly influence parents’ decisions to change schools or
further support them financially. Rural students tend to score below suburban students in
standardized math and reading tests, which has implications for inmigration patterns to
rural areas. Worried for their future, rural school districts across the study sample may
have decided to use the referenda mechanism.
We use Heckman sample selection methods to account for the selection bias resulting
from school districts selecting themselves into the referenda proposal process. We find that

105
few school districts take advantage of educational tax referenda, and of those districts, rural school districts are more likely to do so than their urban counterparts. Moreover, the
most important variables affecting proposal and approval of referenda are racial diversity,
competition from private schools and school district size. For example, the likelihood of
referenda proposal tends to decline with racial diversity in both rural and urban school districts. While rural school districts are more likely to propose referenda in the face of no
private school alternatives, they are less likely when there are several alternatives. Lastly,
while school districts with relatively large enrollments are less likely to propose referenda,
administrations with more personnel are more likely to propose referenda than their counterparts.

5.2. Contributions to the Literature
Schooling is an extremely important community development issue, as school officials
strive to improve school resources for their students and policymakers aim to improve education to boost economic growth. School funding is important for providing educational
opportunities for children and has undergone changes in the past several years. Each state
varies in its distribution of funding among school districts, and state funding has significantly declined for several states as a result of reduced school resources, especially since
the Great Recession. While public education has undergone several waves of school reform
over the past decades, the period after the Great Recession poses new issues with respect
to school funding.
This research makes two types of contributions. The first refers to a better understanding of people’s valuations of the benefits of education. While many agree that people value
education, previous literature has somewhat diverged on how they measure it and what parents are willing to do for their children to achieve better education. This research conveys
that people tend to examine several measures of school quality including test scores, educational expenditures and the demographic and socioeconomic compositions of the student
body. In particular, some people tend to migrate to another locality based on educational
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expenditures, but up to a certain threshold. Some people may choose to remain in their current localities and may be willing to support additional funding for their schools through
property tax increases. School board officials may thereby benefit from learning more
about their residents’ preferences for improvements to local education.
The second type of contribution refers to econometric advancements to the property
value, location choice and tax referenda literature. One, we adapt Mundlak’s (1979) approach to the random-effects meta-regression estimator to identify overall and individual
effects among studies on the effect of school quality on housing prices. Two, we advance
the literature on generalized propensity score techniques by adapting Hirano and Imbens’
(2004) traditional framework to the school quality literature. Three, we adapt the Heckman
bivariate probit specification to school district referenda.

5.3. Study Limitations and Future Work
Previous studies have used very different measures of school quality, sample sizes that
range from few school districts to the entire nation and estimators to account for potential
biases. Our use of moderator variables and correlation coefficients helps bridge those gaps.
However, other methods such as constructing an index to account for school quality variation may be useful for meta–regression analyses. An index that weights school quality and
corresponding school quality controls by prevalence across studies may produce different
results.
One limitation of the educational finance literature is the availability of appropriate
school–district level data for not only educational expenditures, but also for sociodemographic, economic and geographic variables. The Census provides useful migration data
that has been separated by age, race and educational attainment. However, this data is
only available at the county level, making the task of analyzing migration patterns at the
school–district level troublesome. Since we had school-district level expenditure data and
county-level migration data, we used weighting methods to equate the two levels of spa-
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tial aggregation to the best of our ability. Future research can certainly benefit from the
availability of more granular data at the school district level.
Of course, the use of school-district data is not without further nuances. One can argue
that states share borders, and so their nearby school districts may be correlated. One expects
spatial interactions to exist among their local governments of contiguous states. Local
governments influence one another in their public spending decisions such that one local
government has a spillover effect on its neighbor. They often finance educational spending
through property taxes and therefore care how their tax rates and local public expenditures
compare to neighboring jurisdictions. Future work should test for spatial dependence and
heterogeneity across school districts of neighboring states.
Another limitation is the lack of institution detail about referenda in other states, such
as election costs and the restrictions placed on campaigns. Information on who funds the
elections and how much they generally cost would be especially useful for constructing
another exclusion restriction for sample selection modeling, whereby election cost would
not affect voters’ decisions to accept referenda. We use data only for Indiana, Illinois and
Michigan due to the ease with which we were able to collect it. We manually transcribe
referenda pass rates, proposed property tax increase rates, type of property tax referendum
for each school district referendum proposal provided by the online source, Ballotpedia.
Ballotpedia’s data are comprehensive for Illinois and Michigan school districts but not for
other Midwestern school districts and for other states, in general.
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APPENDIX A

The following code corresponds with the generalized propensity score model. Due to
the limited capabilities of STATA’s “gpscore” program, we program our own code in the
more flexible software package R. The code is provided as a document of the structure of
the code and the necessary steps involved in the analysis. The complete code is available
upon request.

inflows <- read.table("GPSVar_3109obs.txt",header=TRUE,sep="\t")
attach(inflows)
medhousinc06 <- medhousinc06/1000

### Data import, variable definitions and user-defined counters

rm(list=ls(all=TRUE))
setwd("/Users/raymondflorax/Dropbox/R-code/")
require(foreign)
require(boot)
require(lmtest)
require(psych) # descriptive stats by group
set.seed(123456789)

### Preamble

#--------------------------------------------------------------------------------# Generalized Propensity Score Matching for Single Treatments with an Application
# to a Tiebout Model of Mover Flows across US Counties
#
# (c) Anita Yadavalli, Raymond J.G.M. Florax and Jing Liu;
# last changed December 11, 2014
#
# Note: contains GPS for linear model with statistical tests and plots, and an
# application for a Tiebout model explaining net mover flows across US counties in
# relation to educational expenditures and taxes
#
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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4 # number of user-defined treatment intervals of treatment variable
5 # number of user-defined treatment intervals with GPS at selected points
1000 # number of bootstrap replications
14 # number of user-defined dose intervals

ks.test(res,"pnorm") # Kolmogorov-Smirnov test

### (2) Normality test conditional treatments and qqplot

form <- formula(logtr˜X) # for fixed effects add factor(st)
reg <- lm(form)
summary(reg)
fit <- reg$fitted.values
res <- reg$res

### (1) Conditional treatment estimate

k
m
r
d

netdommig0506 <- netdommig0506/10000
privnum <- privnum/10
percapproptax06_07 <- percapproptax06_07/1000
X <- cbind(medhousinc06,percdemocrat2008,nonwhite06,percbamore05_09,
perchouse65over2010,netdommig0506,privnum,percapproptax06_07,
ruralurbancontinuumcode)
...
...
n <- nrow(X)
tr <- avgwppexp
logtr <- log(avgwppexp)
data.df <- as.data.frame(cbind(X,tr,logtr))
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dimnames(ttestunadj) <- dimnames(pvalueunadj) <- list(colnames(X),paste("Interval",1:k,sep=""))
ttestunadj
pvalueunadj

qtr <- quantile(logtr,probs=seq(0,1,1/k),type=1)
...
...
ttestunadj <- pvalueunadj <- matrix(0,nvar,k)
for (i in 1:nvar) {
for (j in 1:k) {
test <- t.test(subset(X,ctr==j)[,i],subset(X,ctr!=j)[,i])
ttestunadj[i,j] <- test$statistic
pvalueunadj[i,j] <- test$p.value
}
}

# (4a) unadjusted mean difference, including Welch’s t-test and plot

### (4) Balance property

sig2 <- crossprod(res)/n
GPSo <- dnorm(res,mean=0,sd=sqrt(sig2)) # o for original
plot(density(GPSo),main="GPS density plot")
polygon(density(GPSo),col="lightblue",border=NA)

### (3) GPS estimate assuming normality, and density plot

shapiro.test(res) # Shapiro-Wilk test
qqnorm(res,main="Normal Q-Q plot conditional treatment")
qqline(res)
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bs <- function(formula,data,indices) {
dat <- data[indices,]
reg <- lm(formula,data=dat)
...
...
...
qtr <- quantile(dat$logtr,probs=seq(0,1,1/k),type=1)
ctr <- findInterval(dat$logtr,qtr,rightmost.closed=TRUE,all.inside=TRUE)
cgps <- matrix(0,n,k)
for (i in 1:k) {
temp <- subset(dat$logtr,ctr==i)
mtemp <- median(temp) # user-specified point
GPS <- dnorm(mtemp-fit,mean=0,sd=sqrt(sig2))

# (4.b) mean GPS-adjusted difference, including t-test with bootstrapped standard error, and plot

plot(ttestunadj[,1],type="p",pch=15,ylim=c(min(ttestunadj),max(ttestunadj)),col="black",
ylab="t-statistic",main="Unadjusted t-statistics",lwd=2,xlab="Variable",xaxt="n")
for (i in 2:k) {
lines(ttestunadj[,i],type="p",pch=15,col=i)
}
abline(h=c(-1.960,1.960),col="gray")
legend("bottomleft",title="Interval",legend=c(1:i),fill,pch=15,col=1:k,bty="n")
lab = c("median inc.","% dem.","nonwhite","ba more","househ. >65","net migr.","priv. schools",
"prop. tax","rural-urban")
axis(1,at=c(1:nrow(ttestunadj)),labels=lab)

pvalueunadj <- (pvalueunadj>=0.05) # TRUE is balanced
pvalueunadj
paste("percentage balanced",round(100*sum(pvalueunadj)/(nvar*k)),"%",sep=" ")
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ste <- matrix(apply(results$t,2,sd),nvar,k)
ttestadj <- matrix(results$t0,nvar,k)/ste
pvalueadj <- dt(ttestadj,r-1)
wmdiff <- matrix(results$t0,nvar,k)
dimnames(ttestadj) <- dimnames(pvalueadj) <- dimnames(wmdiff) <- dimnames(ttestunadj)
wmdiff
ttestadj
pvalueadj
pvalueadj <- (pvalueadj>=0.05) # TRUE is balanced
pvalueadj
paste("percentage balanced",round(100*sum(pvalueadj)/(nvar*k)),"%",sep=" ")

results <- boot(data=data.df,statistic=bs,R=r,formula=form)

}

}
mdiff <- array(0,dim=c(k,nvar,m))
wmdiff <- matrix(0,nvar,k)
for (i in 1:k) {
for (j in 1:m) {
cci <- as.numeric(ctr==i & cgps[,i]==j)
notcci <- as.numeric(ctr!=i & cgps[,i]==j)
nisum <- sum(cci+notcci)/n
mdiff[i,,j] <- nisum*((colMeans(subset(dat[,1:nvar],cci==1)))-(colMeans(subset(dat[,1:nvar],notcci==1))))
}
wmdiff <- apply(mdiff,c(1,2),sum)
}
return(c(t(wmdiff)))

...
cgps[,i] <- findInterval(GPS,qgps,rightmost.closed=TRUE,all.inside=TRUE)
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bs <- function(formula,data,indices) {
dat <- data[indices,]

### (6) Dose-response function with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval in plots

tr2 <- trˆ2
tr3 <- trˆ3
GPSo2 <- GPSoˆ2
GPSo3 <- GPSoˆ3
trGPSo <- tr*GPSo
ceo <- lm(inmig2549˜tr+tr2+tr3+GPSo+GPSo2+GPSo3+trGPSo)
summary(ceo)
coefceo <- cbind(ceo$coef)
ceo2 <- lm(inmig2549˜tr+tr2+tr3)
lrgps <- lrtest(ceo,ceo2) # LR test on estimated GPS terms
lrgps

### (5) Conditional expectation of the outcome
# See Hirano and Imbens (2004). Implementation for a 3rd order polynomial of treatment and the
# logarithmic propensity score vector

plot(ttestadj[,1],type="p",pch=15,ylim=c(min(ttestunadj),max(ttestunadj)),col="black",
ylab="t-statistic",main="GPS-adjusted t-statistics",lwd=2,xlab="Variable",xaxt="n")
for (i in 2:k) {
lines(ttestadj[,i],type="p",pch=15,col=i)
}
abline(h=c(-1.960,1.960),col="gray")
legend("bottomleft",title="Interval",legend=c(1:i),fill,pch=15,col=1:k,bty="n")
axis(1,at=c(1:nrow(ttestadj)),labels=lab)
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seavresp <- apply(results$t,2,sd)
band <- qt(0.975,df=r-1)*seavresp*100

results <- boot(data=data.df,statistic=bs,R=r,formula=form)

reg <- lm(formula,dat)
fit <- reg$fitted.values
res <- reg$res
sig2 <- crossprod(res)/n
GPS <- dnorm(res,mean=0,sd=sqrt(sig2))
tr <- data.df$tr
tr2 <- trˆ2
tr3 <- trˆ3
GPS2 <- GPSˆ2
GPS3 <- GPSˆ3
trGPS <- tr*GPS
ceo <- lm(inmig2549˜tr+tr2+tr3+GPS+GPS2+GPS3+trGPS)
coefceo <- cbind(ceo$coef)
# dose <- quantile(tr,probs=seq(0,1,1/d),type=1) # alternative definition using quantiles
avresp <- matrix(0,1,d)
for (i in 1:d) {
dose <<- seq(4800,11300,500)
...
...
resp <- Xtemp%*%coefceo
avresp[,i] <- sum(resp)/n
}
# margresp <- avresp[,2:d]-avresp[,1:d-1] # marginal response; plot needs adapting
return(avresp)
}
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plot(dose,100*results$t0,type="l",
main="Dose-Response Function",xlab="Treatment Level (US$)",ylab="Average Potential Outcome (% point)",
xlim=c(min(dose),max(dose)),ylim=c(min(100*results$t0-band),max(100*results$t0+band)))
polygon(c(rev(dose),dose),c(rev(100*results$t0+band),c(100*results$t0-band)),
col = adjustcolor("blue",alpha.f=0.25),border=NA)
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APPENDIX B

Table B1.: Estimation Results Using IRR
Model 1

Model 2

b (SEb )

b (SEb )

Model 3
Rural
b (SEb )

Urban
b (SEb )

R-U

Propose
intercept

0.306
(0.195)

rural
nonwhite
pop65+
income
college
private
enroll
revenue
admin
IN
IL

−0.012∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.029∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.011∗∗
(0.005)
0.013
(0.022)
−0.019
(0.052)
0.02∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.006
(0.025)
−1.101∗∗∗
(0.07)
−1.944∗∗∗
(0.034)

0.339
(0.338)
−0.055
0.379
−0.012∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.029∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.003∗∗
(0.001)
0.011∗∗
(0.005)
0.012
(0.013)
−0.020
(0.049)
0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.006
(0.025)
−1.099∗∗∗
(0.067)
−1.946∗∗∗
(0.04)

−0.900
(0.97)

−0.026∗∗
(0.009)
0.010
(0.017)
0.003
(0.014)
−0.006
(0.015)
−0.181∗∗∗
(0.046)
−0.160
(0.224)
0.103
(0.064)
0.264∗∗∗
(0.079)
−2.674∗∗∗
(0.669)
−0.781∗
(0.417)

Pass
Table B1 continued

0.764
(0.892)

−1.664

−0.003
(0.007)
−0.040∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.003
(0.008)
0.011∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.083∗∗∗
(0.015)
−0.004
(0.09)
−0.042
(0.034)
−0.041
(0.074)
0.357
(0.459)
−1.433∗∗∗
(0.285)

−0.023
0.050∗
0.006
−0.017
−0.264∗∗∗
−0.156
0.145
0.305∗∗
−3.032∗∗
0.652
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Model 1

Table B1 – Continued from previous page
Model 2
Model 3

b (SEb )
intercept

0.488
(0.938)

b (SEb )

Rural
b (SEb )

0.460
(1.29)
rural
−0.123
(0.121)
nonwhite
0.01
0.009
(0.011)
(0.01)
pop65+
0.026
0.027
(0.022)
(0.021)
income
0.003
0.003
(0.021)
(0.021)
college
0.019
0.018
(0.02)
(0.02)
private
0.074∗∗∗
0.071∗∗∗
(0.018)
(0.018)
revenue
−0.017
−0.017
(0.02)
(0.02)
enroll
0.013
0.011
(0.016)
(0.014)
tax
0.44∗∗∗
0.439∗∗∗
(0.106)
(0.108)
yr2010
0.05
0.153
(0.35)
(0.617)
yr2011
0.091
0.194
(0.354)
(0.416)
yr2013
−0.107
0.110
(0.507)
(0.503)
IN
−1.295∗∗∗
−1.291∗∗
(0.405)
(0.44)
∗∗∗
IL
−1.812
−1.818∗∗
(0.629)
(0.704)
bρ
−0.275
−0.280
(0.226)
(0.252)
ρ
−0.268
−0.273
(0.210)
(0.234)
Wald test χ 2 (1)=1.46 χ 2 (1)=1.23
p> χ 2 =0.23 p> χ 2 =0.27
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.

Urban
b (SEb )

−2.255
(17.528)

−0.040
(0.048)
−0.015
(0.507)
−0.008
(0.317)
0.115∗∗∗
(0.026)
0.001
(0.334)
0.009
(0.148)
−0.913
(1.027)
0.673
(0.904)
1.283
(2.53)
1.034
(1.977)
1.318
(4.003)
1.148
(8.154)
0.315
(8.02)
−1.205
(7.826)
−0.835
(2.368)
χ 2 (1)=0.02
p> χ 2 =0.88

R-U

2.942
(2.453)

−5.197

0.021
(0.023)
0.020
(0.226)
0.001
(0.088)
−0.024
(0.023)
0.084
(0.091)
−0.043
(0.101)
0.204
(0.247)
0.005
(0.274)
−0.714
(3.252)
−0.506
(3.324)
−0.898
(0.612)
−1.076∗∗∗
(0.226)
−0.942
(4.269)

−0.060
−0.035
−0.009
0.140∗∗∗
−0.083
0.053
−1.117
0.668
1.997
1.540
2.216
2.224
1.257
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APPENDIX C

The following article, School Referenda in Indiana: A Rural Perspective, is a Purdue
University extension paper co-authored with Dr. Larry DeBoer and published in the Rural
Indiana Issues Series. It focuses on public school funding and school district decisions to
propose referenda. We examine referenda proposals from 2008 to 2014 and discuss the
determinants of referenda success or failure. We conclude that greater ability to pay in
urban areas and aversion to property taxes by rural agricultural property owners influence
the larger success of referenda proposals in Indiana urban counties than in rural counties.

School Referenda in Indiana: A Rural Perspective

Introduction
Public school funding in the United States is always an important issue. The Great
Recession of 2007–2009 and the slow recovery since then have slowed the growth or even
decreased state funding for local education across the United States. In Indiana, the 2008
property tax reforms provided property tax relief by replacing the property tax for school
district general funds with additional state aid. This made school budgets more dependent
on state aid just as the recession reduced state revenues. In addition, the reforms established
property tax caps, which were voted into the state’s Constitution in 2010.
Many Indiana school districts have turned to referenda to ask their taxpayers for additional funding. From November 2008 to May 2014, there were 54 referenda asking for
approval of added property taxes for general purposes, and 31 passed (57 percent). The
2008 reforms also required that school districts ask voters for approval of debt service
property taxes for large capital projects. From November 2008 to May 2014, there were
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48 capital referenda proposed, and 21 passed (44 percent). In all, 76 different school districts have held at least one referendum since November 2008. The vast majority of school
districts have not held a tax or capital referendum.
In this publication, we look at the history of referenda proposals in Indiana and discuss
the factors that influence whether they pass or fail. We pay particular attention to the results
for referenda in rural and urban school districts. We finish by discussing the implications
of these results for the future of rural school districts.

Schools and the Property Tax Reform
In 2008, the Indiana General Assembly passed the biggest property tax reform and
relief bill in decades. The law had three important effects on school district finances.
First, the law replaced the general fund property tax for school districts with added
state funding. Effective January 1, 2009, there are no local property tax revenues used for
school general funds. School districts are dependent on state revenues and the state school
aid formula for money to fund teacher pay and other operating costs. Unfortunately, the
recession caused shortfalls in sales and income tax revenues just as the state funding began.
Second, the law required referenda to approve large debt-financed construction projects.
The referenda replaced Indiana’s unique petition-and remonstrance process, which allowed
residents to circulate petitions to challenge school capital projects. The referendum requirement moves the decision to the voting booth, requiring voter approval for debt-financed
construction projects.
Third, the law capped the tax bills of property taxpayers, and in 2010, Indiana voters
approved an amendment placing these caps into the state Constitution. Taxpayers whose
bills exceed their caps receive a credit, and the revenue is lost to local governments.
Though the property tax no longer provides revenue for the general fund, schools receive property taxes for transportation, capital projects, and debt service. School districts
are still the largest users of property tax revenue, receiving more than 40 percent of all
property taxes statewide. Indiana school districts lost about $250 million in property tax
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revenues in 2014 due to the property tax caps.

Referenda Results
Referenda were rare before 2008. Capital projects were not subject to referenda, and
schools seldom resorted to tax referenda to raise new money for operating costs. Since
2008, however, referenda have become common. Referenda are now required for big capital projects. But tax referenda have become much more common, too. This may be due to
slow growth in state aid and revenue losses to the property tax caps.
One hundred and two school district referenda were posed to voters from the passage
of the property tax reforms through May 2014. Of these referenda, 53 were proposed by
school districts in Indiana counties classified as urban, 30 were proposed in counties classified as rural/mixed, and 19 were proposed in counties classified as rural. (See Ayres,
Waldorf, and McKendree, 2012 for an explanation of the grouping of Indiana’s 92 counties
into urban, rural/mixed and rural categories. Cross-county school corporations are classified based on their primary county as identified by the Indiana Department of Education.).
Table 1 gives a breakdown of referenda results by county classification.
Two facts stand out in Table 1. First, a majority of referenda have taken place in counties classified as urban (53 of 102 or 52.0 percent). Only 17 of 92 counties are classified as
urban, and 94 of 292 school districts are primarily within those urban counties. More than
half of the referenda have been offered in less than one-third of the school districts.

Second, a larger share of referenda have passed in urban county school districts than in
rural county school districts. In urban counties, 60.4 percent of referenda have passed. In
rural/mixed and rural county districts, 47.4 percent and 36.7 percent have passed, respec-
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tively. Urban counties are more likely to try referenda and more likely to pass the referenda
they try.
It may be that urban districts propose more referenda because they have a greater expectation of success. But why would referenda in urban districts pass more frequently? Two
factors that help explain why urban referenda pass are per capita income and the percent of
assessed value in agriculture. Table 2 shows that rural and rural/mixed counties have lower
incomes per person than urban counties. It also shows that (for obvious reasons) rural and
rural/mixed counties have a larger share of the assessed value of property in agriculture.

Average per capita incomes are lower in rural areas than in urban areas. The percentage
of assessed value in agriculture (for property tax purposes) is much greater in rural areas
than in urban areas. Table 3 shows that these two variables also split significantly in referenda results. Only 42.9 percent of referenda in counties with per capita incomes less than
$35,000 passed. People with higher incomes have a greater ability to pay taxes and may be
more willing to vote for school referenda. People in rural counties have lower incomes, on
average. Only 40.0 percent of referenda in counties with assessed value shares in agriculture of greater than 10 percent passed. People in agriculture own lots of taxable property
and often pay substantially more when property tax rates go up. Of course, people in rural
counties own more agricultural property.

What Does This Mean for Rural Indiana?
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A look at referenda proposals by county classification shows that a larger percent of
proposals succeed in urban counties than in rural counties. There may be many reasons,
including greater ability to pay in urban areas and aversion to property taxes by agricultural
property owners in rural areas.
If rural residents are less likely to pass referenda, rural school districts may find themselves with smaller budgets and older facilities. This may become a statewide equity problem over time. It’s possible that some smaller school districts may have to consider consolidation with neighboring districts. But here is an exception to the rural referenda trend.
There have been 11 referenda proposed by school districts with enrollments of less than
1,000—among the smallest school districts in Indiana. All are in rural or rural-mixed counties. Nine of the 11 have passed, with an average yes-vote of 65 percent. The campaigns for
some of these referenda have suggested that consolidation was a possibility without added
funding. It may be that, when really threatened with the prospect of consolidation, rural
residents are willing to pay for the survival of their local school districts.
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